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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis develops a methodology and novel metric for the design, verification 
and validation of microgrids for resiliency objectives. A systems engineering analysis 
identifies the microgrid function as providing power to facilities to enable mission 
accomplishment. Microgrids can meet the need of Department of Defense (DoD) 
facilities to continue missions by providing power for critical loads when utility power is 
lost. Previous research and existing tools for microgrid design and assessment do not 
adequately address resiliency in terms of mission accomplishment. The resiliency metric 
developed in this thesis, defined as the expected life cycle mission impact (ELMI), 
quantifies microgrid resiliency in terms of its ability to minimize mission impact against 
all potential threats to power disruption. This thesis demonstrates the methodology and 
metric in a case study using a microgrid design that is representative of existing 
microgrids at DoD installations. The case study demonstrates the methodology using a 
set of scenarios including typical equipment failure, potential deliberate attacks, and 
natural disasters. The case study also demonstrates the method by applying it to evaluate 
the resiliency of different microgrid designs. This thesis recommends facility managers 
apply metrics and methods that evaluate microgrid resiliency in terms of mission impact 
and consider a realistic and complete set of scenarios that could disrupt power. 
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There is increased interest by the Department of Defense (DoD) in improving 
energy security and increasing resiliency (ASD [EI&E] 2015). Microgrids are an emerging 
system that can increase the resiliency of DoD facilities to power interruptions (Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command 2016). A modern microgrid consists of a power system 
served by utility power that can continue to provide power in island mode operation using 
distributed energy resources (Lasseter et al. 2002; Marnay and Bailey 2004). The ability to 
operate in island mode allows a microgrid system to continue to meet critical electrical 
loads when utility power is lost (Hirsch, Parag, and Guerrero 2018). However, as an 
emerging system, microgrids also suffer from design challenges, including challenges in 
control of the system due to the fluctuation in power generation and demand (Abu-Sharkh 
et al. 2006). These challenges and the complexity of some microgrid installations create 
difficulties for DoD facilities managers who must design and assess microgrid systems 
(Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2016). DoD microgrids also encounter challenges 
due to their higher risk of being targeted for attack (Hart et al. 2014). Additional 
complications are present in DoD microgrids due to funding for procurement being 
separate from funding for operational costs (Van Broekhoven et al. 2013). 
A review of existing research and literature performed as part of this thesis found 
that most existing research and tools for microgrids focuses on cost objectives. The 
research and tools that do focus on resiliency objectives often assign a cost to the loss of 
load or optimize the system based on the amount of load not met. The review also identifies 
potential threats to energy security to ascertain how microgrids may be impacted by said 
threats or may enable continued energy security against such threats. Threats include 
natural disasters such as hurricanes, deliberate attacks, and equipment failures. A review 
of current guidance finds that NAVFAC provides the NAVFAC P-601 for microgrid 
designs at naval installations. This search also identifies that standards developed or in 
development by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) exist for 
microgrids.  
xvi 
A system engineering analysis of microgrids performed in this thesis identifies the 
overall function of microgrids is to provide power to facilities, which consists of generating 
power, distributing power, storing energy, and system control. Power provided meets the 
needs of the facilities and enables mission accomplishment. A microgrid enables critical 
missions reliant on power to be sustained in the face of threats to energy security by 
continuing to meet critical loads when utility power is lost. The research performed and 
presented in this thesis contends that maximizing resiliency of a microgrid system is best 
achieved by minimizing the mission impact of threats to energy security. These threats 
include both the loss of utility power and the loss of microgrid functionality. This thesis 
proposes that microgrid systems be designed to maximize resiliency against all threats in 
order to maximize mission accomplishment. 
The review and trial of existing design tools performed in the literature review of 
this thesis finds that existing tools are unable to optimize or evaluate designs for an 
objective of mission achievement and cannot be readily modified to do so. Within this 
thesis, a novel methodology and metric are developed to design and assess microgrid 
resiliency. This method contains the following steps: 
1. Define the critical load and contribution of mission achievement from 
each facility served by the microgrid 
2. Generate the list of scenarios, S , and estimate the probability of each, 
( )Pr S s= , for each scenario s . 
3. Determine the recovery time to restore lost functionality from the impacts 
identified in the previous step. 
4. Map the dependency of mission impact against loss of critical load. 
5. Simulate the microgrid system for each scenario S to determine the 
mission impact under that scenario. 
6. Calculate the total expected mission impact. 
7. Analyze the results. 
xvii 
The overall resiliency of the microgrid is defined by the expected life cycle mission 
impact (ELMI), which is developed in this research: 
 ( ) s
s S
ELMI Pr S s M
∈
≡ =∑  
Due to the stochastic nature of load and power generation within a microgrid, this 
thesis develops a simulation model that estimates load at facilities using the commercial 
reference buildings from the Department of Energy (DOE) and photovoltaic power 
generation using solar incidence data from the National Solar Radiation Data Base. The 
simulation model then simulates the microgrid in hourly time steps to determine the 
microgrid system response, load shedding, and the subsequent mission impact in each 
scenario through Monte Carlo simulation methods. 
The research presented in this thesis applies the method to a case study, using a 
representative microgrid design that is characteristic of microgrids found during a review 
of existing microgrid systems. The case study uses the method first to evaluate a baseline 
microgrid system, then iterates the baseline design to achieve the desired resiliency against 
a two-week duration utility power outage. Next, the method developed in this thesis is 
applied to estimate the overall ELMI against potential equipment failures. Analysis of 
equipment failure finds that the representative microgrid system is most impacted by 
failure of the energy storage system (ESS). Next, an analysis of the mission impact for 
potential high impact failure modes or attacks concludes that loss of either two generators 
or a generator and either the photovoltaic (PV) array or ESS produces the highest mission 
impact. An exploration of potential design alternatives discovers that the PV array size and 
ESS size can be reduced significantly without impacting system resiliency against a two-
week duration utility outage. An examination of potential load-shedding strategy 
alternatives identifies that prioritizing load shedding by the amount of mission impact per 
kW demand produces superior resiliency. Lastly, a comparison of mission impact 
prioritization versus load-shedding prioritization concludes that a mission impact focused 
load-shedding strategy results in the highest level of resiliency for the representative 
microgrid system. Mission impact is significantly improved even when load shed is similar 
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Availability of electricity at military facilities is necessary to meet Department of 
Defense (DoD) mission requirements (ODASD[IE] 2018). Threats to energy security can 
compromise this availability of electricity (Lambert and others 2011). There is increased 
interest in improving energy security by the DoD, including strengthening the resiliency of 
electrical power systems to natural disturbances, faults, and deliberate attack (ASD (EI&E) 
2015). Current strategies for backup power at DoD facilities include backup generators and 
uninterruptible power supplies (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2017). Microgrids 
are an emerging system that can increase the resiliency of DoD facilities to power 
interruptions (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2016). The modern microgrid 
concept of a power system served by utility power that can continue to provide power in 
island mode operation using distributed energy resources was established in the early 2000s 
(Lasseter et al. 2002; Marnay and Bailey 2004). The microgrid can improve the ability to 
continue to meet critical electrical loads when utility power is lost (Hirsch, Parag, and 
Guerrero 2018). 
A. BACKGROUND 
Existing DoD objectives and methods for energy security focus on meeting mission 
requirements (ODASD[IE] 2018). Facilities with critical loads for mission requirements 
commonly utilize diesel drive generators to provide backup electrical power in the event 
of a loss of power (Van Broekhoven et al. 2012). Uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) are 
also used with equipment that cannot sustain a momentary loss of power (Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command 2014). A UPS provides electrical power typically using a battery 
for the short duration between the loss of utility power and the supply of power provided 
after the generator starts and transfer switches disconnect from the utility grid and connect 
the generator to the facility (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2014; IEEE 2013). 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The overall objective of this thesis is to enhance the resilience of microgrids. This 
thesis approaches this objective by developing improved design methodologies and metrics 
2 
that are focused on resiliency and tied to the stakeholder needs that are met by the 
microgrid. This thesis also seeks to demonstrate the methodologies in a case study that can 
be used as a template by others. A secondary objective of this thesis is to document the 
factors that affect resiliency to guide potential design considerations and explorations 
C. MICROGRID PURPOSE 
Existing microgrids systems are deployed for various reasons. Hirsch, Parag, and 
Guerrero state that the primary purposes are increased electrical power security, reduction 
in energy life cycle costs, increased utilization of renewable energy resources, and supply 
of electrical power to remote areas (2018). DoD interests in microgrids are primarily driven 
by concerns for increased energy security (ODASD[IE] 2018). DoD policy and objectives 
such as 10 U.S.C. § 2911(e) and 42 U.S.C. § 15852 establish goals for the percentage of 
renewable power used and encourage its increased usage. This provides a secondary 
motivation due to the ability of microgrids to benefit increased use of renewable energy 
resources (Bower et al. 2014). 
1. Microgrid Description 
A microgrid is defined by the Department of Energy (DOE) as 
a group of interconnected loads and distributed energy resources within 
clearly defined electrical boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity 
with respect to the grid. A microgrid can connect and disconnect from the 
grid to enable it to operate in either grid-connected or island-mode. 
(Berkeley Lab n.d., para 2) 
From the systems engineering perspective, the overall function of a microgrid 
identified in this research is to supply electrical power to the necessary facilities and other 
loads. Functional decomposition in the system analysis portion of this research identified 
four main functions that the microgrid performs: generating power, distributing power, 
storing energy, and system control. To function in island mode without a connection to 
utility power, the microgrid must either generate its own power or utilize stored energy. 
Microgrids found during the survey and review of currently deployed systems almost 
universally implemented both functions (Asmus, Forni, and Vogel 2018). Figure 1 presents 
an overview diagram of microgrid system including typical components and distribution 
3 
voltages. Power is received from the transmission system at high voltages, stepped down 
to seven to 13 kV for distribution, and then finally reduced to 120 to 480 volts at the service 
entrance (Short 2004). 
 
Figure 1. Microgrid Overview Diagram 
Energy storage provides a means to balance load against power generation, as noted 
by Díaz-González, Sumper, and Gomis-Bellmunt (2016). They remark that this function is 
important within microgrids that utilize significant renewable generation such as 
photovoltaic (PV) or wind generation as these sources are variable in nature. The authors 
highlight that energy storage can supply the balance of power demand when generation 
available from renewable sources is insufficient to meet demand or unavailable, and when 
available generation exceeds supply, the excess energy can then be stored. Energy storage 
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also provides benefits to system stability (Hirsch, Parag, and Guerrero 2018). A microgrid 
does not contain significant inertia in comparison to a large utility grid and changes in load 
or generation can cause significant fluctuations in voltage and frequency (Short 2004; Abu-
Sharkh et al. 2006). Power generated by sources such as PV can rapidly fluctuate due to 
cloud cover (Abu-Sharkh et al. 2006). The most common form of energy storage found 
within the microgrids surveyed under this research was chemical batteries, which store DC 
power (Asmus, Forni, and Vogel 2018). Energy storage can also take the form of pumped-
storage hydropower, flywheels, and thermal storage via ice or hot/cold water to meet 
heating and cooling demands (International Energy Agency 2014). The energy storage 
subsystem can consist of a single energy storage systems (ESS), or various ESS of different 
types throughout the microgrid (Díaz-González, Sumper, and Gomis-Bellmunt 2016; 
Garche and Moseley 2014). 
Microgrid power production is performed by various distributed generation (DG) 
resources, such as diesel-powered generators, small combined/heat power (CHP) 
generators, photovoltaic (PV) generators, and wind generators (Hirsch, Parag, and 
Guerrero 2018). The type of power generated by each resource can vary. Diesel generators 
used for emergency backup power typically produce AC power at voltages matching that 
at the service connection to the facility (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2014). For 
large power plants, which serve a large area, a generator may provide higher voltage AC 
at the distribution voltage and be connected to a main bus (Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command 2014). PV panels produce DC power and require inverters for connection to 
generate AC power (Krauter 2006). Each DG resource offers different capabilities, 
advantages, and disadvantages. Diesel-powered generators can produce power to meet 
demand as needed for backup power, and can be brought online quickly, but must rely on 
fuel storage and resupply to operate (IEEE 1996). CHP power plants with gas turbine 
generators can provide high power output, but also rely on a supply of fuel (IEEE 1996; 
Hirsch, Parag, and Guerrero 2018). Renewable energy sources provide power without 
needing resupply of fuel, but power output is variable and reliant on energy resources 
available from the environment (Ansari, Safari, and Chung 2017). 
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A power distribution system transmits power throughout the system, moving power 
from where it is produced to where it is consumed, as described by Hatziargyriou (2014). 
He states the distribution system includes the physical lines that carry electrical power. The 
lines carrying power can be overhead lines on utility poles or lines that run underground 
(Short 2004). Additionally, Short describes the other elements of the distribution system, 
including power conversion elements such as transformers for stepping AC voltage up and 
down and DC-AC converters, and connections points such as electrical busses where 
different portions of the distribution system connect. Switches within the power 
distribution system are used to control power flow within the system and the connection of 
the microgrid to the utility power system (Lasseter et al. 2002).  
Control of the entire microgrid is performed by a microgrid controller. This 
encompasses controlling the DG resources, ESS, and power distribution systems (Hirsch, 
Parag, and Guerrero 2018). The control system can command how much power each DG 
resource is producing, the flow of power into and out of the ESS, and operation of the 
power distribution system to regulate which loads are receiving power, as discussed by 
Bower et al. (2014). They also identified that the controller manages the connection state 
and flow of power between the microgrid and utility power system. Bower et al. continue 
that information to the controller may comprise voltage, frequency, and current flows 
throughout the system and state information of the components such as amount of available 
energy storage or functional status. The microgrid controller may consist of either a central 
controller or a decentralized multiagent system (Zhou and Ho 2016). 
Depending on the operational state of the microgrid, not all loads may be powered. 
Loads can be categorized as total loads, priority loads, and critical loads (Savena 2017). 
During normal operation with utility power available, all loads receive power. Savena 
(2017) states that during islanded operation, low priority loads are shed, and only priority 
loads are powered. He explains that if further load shedding is needed due to lack of 
generation or energy storage resources then only critical loads receive power and maximize 
the time the system can operate in island mode. These load requirements during the 
different operational states define the requirements for providing electrical power for the 
system. The concentration of guidance and research found in microgrids for energy security 
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is meeting critical loads while islanded, such as discussed by Savena, Judson, and Pina 
(2017), Narayanan and others (2017), and Bower et al. (2014). These critical loads are 
necessary to continue mission achievement. 
 
Figure 2. Load Priorities. Source: Savena (2017). 
2. Microgrid Challenges 
Design of microgrids is a challenging engineering problem due to the number of 
generation sources and loads, diverse mix of generation, lower level of isolation of loads 
from generation which require tightly coordinated operation, and the need to provide stable 
power when transitioning from utility power to islanded mode (Guerrero et al. 2013; Jones 
2018). As an emerging technology, microgrids can also suffer from immaturity in the 
design and analysis of the systems (Hirsch, Parag, and Guerrero 2018). Microgrid system 
components may use proprietary controls and communication protocols, requiring the use 
of additional components to integrate the system (Vaccaro et al. 2011; Shi et al. 2014). The 
review of microgrid standards performed by this thesis found control and communication 
standards are emerging and have recently been implemented by the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) or are in the process of being defined (IEEE 2018c; IEEE 
2018d; Burger 2018; IEEE 2018b). However, existing systems built before the IEEE 
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standards existed may contain components that do not conform to those standards. Some 
IEEE standards affecting microgrids are still evolving, such as those necessary to allow PV 
generation during island mode operation (Krstic and Pier 2015). Additional challenges may 
be realized as producers and vendors of existing equipment exit the business, leading to 
lack of design data and documentation and the need to reverse engineer controls (Manson, 
Ravikumar, and Raghupathula 2018). 
The design complexity, evolving technology, and many stakeholders make 
management and review of the design and installation of microgrids a difficult problem for 
facilities managers (Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson 2010; Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command 2016). Requirements for critical loads must be determined by coordination 
between the system designer and the facilities manager (Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command 2017). The design must consider the critical loads, the requirements for 
reliability and resiliency, the existing infrastructure, reliability of utility power, and mission 
requirements (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2016). Microgrids for DoD 
applications must also give heightened consideration for deliberate attack and 
cybersecurity (Burger 2019). Site information for existing infrastructure is often 
incomplete, requiring visits to the location to collect additional information (B. Long, email 
to author, June 19, 2019). 
D. THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY 
Threats to energy security can result from lack of reliability in the source power 
from the utility grid, reliability of components within the microgrid, damage to the grid 
due to accidents or natural disasters, and deliberate attack to the electrical grid (ICF 
International 2016; Office of Technology Assessment 1990). Each installation needs to 
consider the likelihood and impact of each of the various threats to energy security when 
designing a microgrid (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2018). Physical security 
reduces the likelihood of vandalism or attack and increases the chance and speed of 
detection (Battis, Kurtovich, and O’Donnell 2018). The North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) (2012) advises balancing the costs of these security 
measures against the likelihood and impacts of potential threats. Designs that optimize 
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against one threat and to the exclusion of other potential threats may provide lower energy 
security against the other more likely and impactful threats. For instance, buried 
distribution lines are less likely to be damaged during a storm and are less accessible and 
visible for intentional attack but are also more expensive to install and take longer to repair 
(The Gridwise Alliance 2013; Office of Technology Assessment 1990). This research 
contends that a holistic approach based on risk and consequences of all threats is necessary 
to effectively design the system based on the analysis of guidance by the NAVFAC P-603 
(2018), NERC (2012), and Savena (2017). 
Deliberate attacks can come in the form of physical attacks against the system and 
cyberattacks (ICF International 2016). Past attacks have included malicious destruction of 
substation components via sniper rifles (Reavy 2016; R. Smith 2014), vandalism of high 
voltage transmission lines from a private aircraft (Cherry 2018), and attacks on distribution 
feeders (Holstege and Randazzo 2014; Behr 2015). “Fourteen transmission towers in rural 
Oregon were bombed in 1974 by two extortionists threatening to black out Portland if they 
were not paid $1 million” (Sovacool 2011, 30). Cyber-attacks have resulted in widespread 
power loss twice in the Ukraine, once in 2015 and again in 2016 (Campbell 2018). 
Increased consideration for cyber-attack on infrastructure has been witnessed, with recently 
introduced legislation directing a study on ways to establish ways to “isolate the grid from 
attacks,” including the use of “analog and nondigital control system” (Walton 2019, para 
5, 8). Probing of power systems and other critical infrastructure for potential cyberattack 
is ongoing by nations as part of the overall defense strategy (Campbell 2018; Sanger and 
Pelroth 2019; Greenberg 2019). Attack on power infrastructure has taken place in past 
conflicts (Griffith, Thomas E , Jr 1994) Hacking and malware on grid control equipment 
in the United States and Europe has been found, with the level of compromise reaching the 
point of having the ability to control grid operations and potentially cause widespread 
power loss (Greenberg 2017). Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks could cause 
widespread outages or and effects outside the area of attack due to a cascading failure (ICF 
International 2016). 
Although deliberate attack is a concern, accidents and damage due to factors such 
as vegetation account for the largest portions of outages (Simpson and Van Bossuyt 1996); 
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where attack is deliberate, physical damage to the power system is typically from 
vandalism and metal theft as crimes of opportunity (Battis, Kurtovich, and O’Donnell 
2018). Long-term loss of utility power can result from large-scale blackouts, which affect 
large geographic regions, as discussed by Čepin (2011). Čepin continues that the 
probability of large-scale blackouts is low, but they can cause significant impacts due to 
widespread power loss. These effects can include automotive accidents, people getting 
trapped in public transit trains and on elevators, significant economic losses, and damage 
due to looting (Corwin and Miles 1978; Čepin 2011). Durations of past blackouts typically 
were several hours to less than 24 hours, although disruptions of over a week have occurred 
to some affected areas (Čepin 2011). Čepin provides examples of significant events 
including the following: 
• USA and Canada blackout, Aug 14, 2003 
• Austria blackout, Aug 27, 2003 
• London blackout, Aug 28, 2003 
• Southern Sweden and Denmark blackout, Sep 23, 2003 
• Italian and Swiss blackout, Sep 28, 2003 
• Greece blackout, July 12, 2004 
• Moscow blackout, May 25, 2005 (2011, 15–16) 
Risk of failure of the microgrid itself is another threat to energy security. Significant 
events such as hurricanes can cause widespread damage (Guikema, Quiring, and Han 
2010). Above-ground transmission components are susceptible to damage from high winds 
(Office of Technology Assessment 1990). Photovoltaic systems are also susceptible to 
damage due to winds in significant storm events (Burgess and Goodman 2018; Hotchkiss 
2017). In these events, damage which disrupts utility power is also likely to disrupt or 
damage distribution or generating components within the microgrid (Guikema, Quiring, 
and Han 2010; Hotchkiss 2017). This damage can negatively impact microgrid 
functionality and may result in the inability to meet critical loads. In most cases, the 
microgrid also serves as the local distribution system for utility power (Lasseter et al. 
2002). This will cause failures or damage to the power distribution system components 
within the microgrid may result in loss of power even without any loss of utility power 
(Brown 2008). 
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E. DOD INSTALLATION ISSUES 
Although deliberate attacks on distribution systems are not typical due to the low 
impact and high resiliency of the distribution system (Battis, Kurtovich, and O’Donnell 
2018), military facilities can be a more attractive and likely target due to the importance of 
their mission and higher value versus civilian facilities served by microgrids (Hart et al. 
2014). Inspection of electrical systems on several federal installations in the continental 
United States performed by the author found many distribution components are physically 
accessible for deliberate attack by personnel authorized to enter the installation. 
Distribution components which are located within a DoD installation could still be 
damaged from attack originating outside the installation perimeter. Attackers using rifles 
from outside the fenced perimeter of an installation, similar to the tactic that was used by 
attackers in the Metcalf incident, could be executed where a transformer or substation is 
visible from the surrounding areas (Angerholzer, Cilluffo, and Mahaffee 2014). 
DoD installations also must contend with financial issues which are unique from 
those in the private sector (Marqusee, Schultz, and Robyn 2017). Funding for procurement 
is separate from funding that pays for operational costs, and this separation of funds can 
provide challenges in projects where life cycle cost reductions are achievable with 
additional upfront capital costs (Van Broekhoven et al. 2013). Use of third-party financing 
options such as a utility energy services contract (UESC) or purchase power agreements 
(PPA) can realize the benefits of these system without programmed military construction 
(MILCON) appropriations (ODASD[IE] 2018).  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents the literature review, which identifies prior research on 
microgrids and energy security, relevant standards and doctrine, and existing tools and 
techniques utilized for microgrid designs. The objective of this chapter is to identify gaps 
and deficiencies in current methods and research that can be addressed under the research 
presented in this thesis. The literature review searches for existing doctrine and standards 
which are relevant to microgrid designs and focuses on microgrids for DoD applications 
and those which are meant to improve energy security. Existing design and deployment 
issues with microgrids and prior research and methods to address such issues are presented 
in this section. The methodology developed under this research incorporates elements of 
methods found during the literature review where applicable. The literature review also 
captures research into various design elements of microgrids to identify the design 
elements which could affect energy security and system resiliency. Best practices and 
factors which should be considered during the microgrid system engineering and risk and 
resiliency analysis process are documented. 
A. MICROGRID SYSTEMS AND DESIGN 
Most existing research on optimizing microgrid design focuses on cost objectives. 
The tools and methods found in most research consist of the formulation and minimization 
of a cost objective function such as overall life cycle cost (LBNL 2018; Petri 2017; 
HOMER Energy LLC 2019). Where load shedding is factored in, the formulation assigns 
a cost to the unmet load (Keesee 2018; Paniagua Sánchez-Mateos 2016; Petri 2017; 
Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick 2005). Other research assigns the amount of load shedding 
allowable as a constraint in the formulation (Ulmer 2014; Paniagua Sánchez-Mateos 2016). 
Guidance documents for energy security in military microgrids attempt to optimize the 
design through the maximization of the reliability of meeting the critical loads given a fixed 
investment or targeting a specific reliability value and minimizing a life cycle cost 
objective function with reliability as a constraint (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
2017). Research from the Operations Research (OR) perspective performed on microgrids 
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and electrical transmission systems sets objectives based on cost, resilience, and hardening 
against attack. Details of the above summary are presented below separated by topic area. 
1. System Optimization 
The goal of the research within this thesis is system optimization to maximize 
resiliency of the system against threats. To guide in that goal, the literature review seeks 
prior research with similar goals to identify potential gaps and existing knowledge. It also 
searches for optimization with other objectives to understand where competing objectives 
may exist and identify other considerations. 
Petri (2017) builds a model in Python which determines the optimum configuration 
of a power distribution system. The objective function is his model minimizes cost due to 
load shedding by assigning a cost to the amount of real and reactive load shed at each bus. 
He defines constraints on load capacities between nodes and calculated real and reactive 
power on each line between nodes. Petri’s model incorporates failure of elements within 
the system. Sánchez-Mateos (2016) generates a model which optimizes a microgrid design 
and quantifies the improvements to reliability achieved and profitability. The optimization 
for profitability in his model uses a value of load loss for the financial benefits. He 
incorporates uncertainty into the analysis and explored the sensitivity of the reliability and 
profitability based on various factors. Fard et al. (2015) presents methods to optimize the 
size of components within a microgrid with a target equivalent loss factor (ELF). ELF is 
an index that captures total load not met. Fard et al.’s method uses a time step model and 
uses a stochastic model to capture the variability of PV and wind power. Ulmer (2014) 
develops a model to optimize a DoD installation microgrid architecture for resiliency given 
fiscal constraints. His model used island mode operation time as the metric for resiliency 
and uses a stochastic model for solar and wind generation. Ulmer also explored the 
sensitivity of island mode operation time against procurement cost and energy storage 
capacity. Keesee (2018) develops a tool for the design tool for a PV array and battery 
storage system to improve the energy security and applies the method in a case study to a 
facility located at Naval Support Activity Monterey. To explore the impact of location and 
climate on the design, Keesee also applies the tool to a facility in Miramar, CA. 
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Bahramirad, Reder, and Khodaei (2012) developed an optimization technique for a 
microgrid design under uncertainty of demand, renewable energy availability, and pricing 
and with given reliability constraints for the components in the system. The optimization 
by Bahramirad, Reder, and Khodaei uses a value of lost load to optimize for net cost. 
2. Vulnerability to Attack 
Deliberate attacks are one threats to energy security (ICF International 2016). The 
literature review searches for prior research on deliberate attack on a power system with 
the goal of understanding the likelihood, potential effects, and possible defenses against 
this threat. Salmeron, Wood, and Ross perform a series of endeavors from the OR 
perspective on optimization of the design of a large power transmission system against 
attack (Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick 2003; Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick 2004; 
Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick 2005). The three-part series of research papers, “Optimizing 
Electric Grid Design under Asymmetric Threat,” considers the vulnerability of the electric 
grid to a terrorist attack. Their work within the three papers identifies the assets within the 
grid most likely to be attacked to guide decisions for optimizing the design and assets to 
harden against these threats. The optimization model used by Salmeron, Wood, and Ross 
assigns a cost function to the load shed and generation at each bus and minimizes the cost 
function. Their optimization model then uses heuristics to find the most valuable assets for 
attack. The second report in the series extends the model to consider restoration of the 
system to determine the total disruption in terms of load shedding over time. Their model 
estimates repair times for each component, calculates the total disruption as the product of 
load shed against time. The third report in the “Optimizing Electric Grid Design under 
Asymmetric Threat” series summarizes the finding of the previous two reports and applies 
the algorithms developed to power grids representing existing real-world deployed grids. 
Their third report also presented the Vulnerability of Electric Power Grids Analyzer 
(VEGA) developed under the research of the series. The VEGA software implements the 
models developed and includes a graphical user interface (GUI) for inputs of the grid 
parameters and results (Stathakos 2003). 
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3. Decision Analysis Methods 
System design involves decisions balancing cost, possibly competing stakeholder 
needs, and uncertainty (Buede 2016). The literature review focuses attention on analysis 
methods which could be applied during the analysis portion of this research or incorporated 
into the methodology being developed. Karvetski, Lambert and Linkov (2011) develop and 
demonstrate a method for decision analysis for energy security of military facilities under 
uncertainty. Their method compared alternatives by assessing each against performance 
criteria mapped to a set of objectives. The performance criteria can capture stakeholder 
value with multiple objectives, such as energy security and increased energy efficiency 
(Karvetski, Lambert, and Linkov 2011). Impacts of decision under uncertainty for the 
alternatives are captured by Karvetski, Lambert and Linkov by defining a set of scenarios, 
with each of these scenarios made up of one or more emergent conditions. Their research 
concludes that the impact on the objectives for each scenario, and the likelihood of each 
scenario, could then be used for the decision analysis and selection of the best alternatives  
4. Power Systems and Microgrid Overview 
Background information on power system and microgrids provides information on 
typical designs and parameters, potential components, system objectives, and current 
challenges. Lin, Bie, and Qiu (2018) review research in the area of power system resiliency. 
Their review documents research in areas in the planning and design phase, probability and 
potential disruptions to the system, and the system response to resist and recover to the 
disturbance. Bower et al. (2014) provided an overview of microgrids, their components, 
microgrid design, and a synopsis of current technical challenges, development area, 
applications, relevant standards and codes, and ability of microgrids to improve electrical 
system resiliency. Bower et al. also provided an overview of the objectives and activities 
within the DOE Advanced Microgrid Program. Hatziargyriou (2014) presented an 
overview of the various benefits of microgrids including economic, environmental, and 




The control system is identified as one of the major subsystems within the 
microgrid under the system analysis portion of this thesis report. Understanding control 
system designs and control strategies can provide insight into on potential options to 
explore when designing the system. Cardoso et al. (2013) applied a stochastic method to 
optimize battery scheduling within a microgrid given uncertainty. Their method used the 
Operation version of DER-CAM and is applied to the case of the Santa Rita Jail with 
uncertainty in the availability of an unreliable fuel cell. Veitch et al. (2013) developed a 
reference architecture, guidelines, and recommendations for a secure microgrid control 
system for DoD installations. Colson, Nehrir, and Gunderson (2011) explored the use a 
distributed control system for a microgrid. Brooks et al. (2010) investigated the ability to 
perform load shedding and resulting effects through dispatch control of loads in a smart 
grid. Kleissl, Torre, and Washorn (2015) performed research on control methods 
incorporating solar forecasting and how it can improve the resiliency of the system to 
changes in PV output. 
6. Design Factors 
Other components within the system and design decisions may affect system 
reliance. The literature review explores research in those areas to identify potential designs 
to explore and understand typical factors which could affect resilience.  Xu (2016) explored 
the effects of the protective control system on microgrid reliability, with further research 
in deficient protection schemes on system reliability (2017). Maliszewski and Perrings 
(2012) identify factors that affect the resilience of power distribution systems through 
analysis of power disruptions in a residential power system. Mitra (2010) develops an 
approach for the sizing of an energy backup system to reach a target power reliability. 
Aming et al. (2007) examines the impacts on energy storage sizing on energy reliability in 
terms of its impact on SAIDI and SAIFI.  
7. Design Guidance 
Existing guidance on power systems and microgrids provides the constraints on the 
design, presents typical systems as a reference, and identifies design considerations to 
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incorporate during the system design and analysis. NAVFAC provides microgrid design 
guidance in the NAVFAC P-601. The NAVFAC guidance provides an overview and 
background on microgrid systems, system design and analysis guidance, business case 
analysis guidance, and relevant considerations and related guidance (Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command 2016). The Federal Energy Management Program provides 
guidance to federal facility managers to perform energy security assessments (U.S. DOE 
n.d.). Their guidance is holistic in its approach, with considerations of the entire set of 
threats, loads requirements which support mission accomplishment, identification of 
contingency operations, and funding the projects. NAVFAC also provides guidance for 
naval facilities within the P-602 (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2017). The 
guidance within the P-602 establishes the “3 pillars of energy security” as reliability, 
resiliency, and efficiency. The P-602 also addresses standards for reliability of utility 
power, resiliency requirements for different facilities in terms of redundant power and fuel 
storage, and efficiency benchmarks. 
8. Power System Resilience and Reliability 
Factors affecting resilience and reliability of a microgrid are necessary to 
understand which factors should be explored under the methodology developed by this 
thesis. Resilience and reliability factors may also provide guidance when generating 
possible architectures to analyze. Ansari, Safar, and Chung (2017) investigate the impacts 
of solar and wind generation on the SAIDI and SAIFI of a power system, using a stochastic 
model to capture the variable nature of wind and solar generation. Cheng, Duan, and Chow 
(2018) show that the use of distributed controls can improve the resiliency of the microgrid 
system. Kim and Dvorkin (2018) investigate use of mobile energy storage systems to both 
improve resiliency of a power distribution system during emergencies such as a natural 
disaster and improve the cost effectiveness of ESS during normal operation. Ang (2006) 
formulates a method to optimize the recovery efforts of a power grid which has been 
damaged by minimization the cost of power shed. Preston et al. (2016) examine the 
multiple threats and factors related to resiliency for power systems. Their report examines 
a wide range of aspects, including threats from natural disasters and deliberate and 
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accidental attack including combined threats and the overall aspects of the system and 
supporting activities affecting resiliency.  
B. RESILIENCY 
A clean and unambiguous definition of resilience is important to have when 
optimizing towards that objective. Additionally, how resilience is valued must also defined 
so that different architectures can be compared in a consistent and relevant manner. This 
section of the literature review examines relevant existing literature on how resilience is 
defined across several domains. The literature review concentrates on resilience for 
infrastructure and power systems. The factors that affect resilience are documented for 
consideration of areas of exploration within the research in this thesis. 
1. Definitions of Resiliency 
Resiliency of a system can be defined in multiple ways. Definitions include the 
ability of the system to continue to function against a disturbance, to maintain vital 
functions against a major disruption, and to minimize the duration and impact of a 
disruption or set of disruptions (Hosseini, Barker, and Ramirez-Marquez 2016) Resilience, 
as defined within Presidential Policy Directive 21, Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience, is 
The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand 
and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to 
withstand and recover from disturbances of the deliberate attack types, 
accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents. (The White House 
2013) 
For DoD facilities, DoD Instruction 4170.11 defines energy resilience as “the 
ability to prepare for and recover from energy disruptions that impact mission assurance 
on military installations” and critical energy requirements as “critical mission operations 
on military installations or facilities that require a continuous supply of energy in the event 
of an energy disruption or emergency” (USD[AT&L] 2016). Within 10 U.S. Code 
§ 101(e)(6), energy resilience is states as 
The ability to avoid, prepare for, minimize, adapt to, and recover from 
anticipated and unanticipated energy disruptions in order to ensure energy 
18 
availability and reliability sufficient to provide for mission assurance and 
readiness, including task critical assets and other mission essential 
operations related to readiness, and to execute or rapidly reestablish mission 
essential requirements.  
10 U.S. Code § 101(e)(8) also defines resilience regarding military facilities. This 
definition of resilience beyond the power system can be useful when considering the 
external effects of a power outage on other necessary facilities and utilities and the 
interrelation between those other external systems and the microgrid and facilities. 
Additionally, significant events such as natural disaster will likely cause failure of multiple 
systems necessary for mission accomplishment beyond the power system. The code defines 
the resiliency of military installations as 
the capability of a military installation to avoid, prepare for, minimize the 
effect of, adapt to, and recover from extreme weather events, or from 
anticipated or unanticipated changes in environmental conditions, that do, 
or have the potential to, adversely affect the military installation or essential 
transportation, logistical, or other necessary resources outside of the 
military installation that are necessary in order to maintain, improve, or 
rapidly reestablish installation mission assurance and mission-essential 
functions. 
The NAVFAC P-602 guidance also provides a definition of resilience from the 
view of naval facilities resiliency. The guidance addresses the types of disturbances which 
could be relevant for energy security at naval facilities and ties the concept of resiliency to 
mission. 
Resiliency is the ability of a system to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond, 
adapt, and recover from a disturbance. Threats that may cause a disturbance 
include weather events, accidents, geo-magnetic storms, terrorism, fire, 
cyberattack, and the effects of climate change e.g., sea level rise. Energy 
resiliency will ensure DON installations have the ability to both prepare for 
and recover from utility interruptions that impact mission assurance and 
installations. (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2017) 
Yodo and Wang (2016) present an approach for quantifying resilience of a system 
in terms of the total impacts of an event on the system performance loss from the time of 
the disruption until full recovery. They state that the resilient system goes through five 
stages: reliability, unreliability, disrupted, recovery, and recovered. Yodo and Wang define 
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reliability is the state of the system prior to the disturbance, and unreliability is the stage 
when the system performance degrades until it reaches the disrupted state. They continue 
that the disrupted stage, the system is at a new, lower performance steady state, and 
recovery is the period when system performance improves until it reaches the recovered 
state when steady state full performance is again achieved. Yodo and Wang say that a 
nonresilient system will either stay in a degraded state or continue to degrade until 
complete failure. Further work by Yodo and Wang (2015) describes a method to capture 
the reaction of the system through those stages from disturbance to recovery using a 
Bayesian Network. 
Widergren et al. (2018) approach resiliency using a multifaceted view of resilience 
regarding power systems. They define the elements of resiliency as stress avoidance, stress 
resistance, and strain adjustment. Their definition of resiliency includes elements of 
preventing a disturbance and the ability function in a fully functional and degraded state 
when a disturbance does occur. The definition of resiliency by Widergren et al. considers 
the total factors that affect the ability of the power system to provide power. 
The DoD doctrine prescribes resiliency using a days of autonomy metric. For naval 
facilities, this metric is seven days of autonomy as driven by UFC 3–540-01, which dictates 
the amount of onsite fuel storage for backup generators (Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command 2014). For the Army, the metric is 14 days of power and water for critical 
missions (Secretary of the Army 2017). For the Marines, the metric is prescribed as the 
ability for installations to “stay mission operable off of the grid for at least 14 days” 
(Coglianese 2019, 4). 
For the purposes of this thesis research, resiliency of the microgrid is defined as the 
ability of the system to maximize functionality in the event of a disruption. Maximizing 
resiliency means the system provides the maximum functionality against the entire set of 
potential disruptions, considering both the likelihood and impact of each disruption. This 
definition of resiliency most closely aligns with the overall functional requirement 
identified during the system analysis portion of this research. It also closely aligns with the 
resiliency objectives found for DoD facilities within the doctrine and guidance documents 
found during the literature review.  
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2. Value of Resiliency 
The value of resiliency from the stakeholders’ perspective provides important 
guidance for the system design (Buede 2016). It allows exploration of the trade space 
between cost, resilience, and other requirements for effective analysis (Buede 2016). For 
some cases, the value of this resilience can be defined in terms of real dollars (Rickerson, 
Gillis, and Bulkeley 2019). For production or industrial applications, the loss of production 
or material in process due to a power loss can be determined (Giraldez et al. 2012). 
Combined with the likelihood of power loss, the value of resiliency is determined by that 
likely impact (Giraldez et al. 2012). For the DoD, the product is national defense, which 
does not have an easily defined value (Hathaway 2019). No standard for defining the value 
of resiliency exists within the DoD (Rusco and Lepore 2016). DoD applications utilizing 
alternative financing in which private companies build and operate the system and sell the 
power to the DoD presents challenges when trying to quantify the benefits of improved 
energy resiliency (Rusco and Lepore 2016). Some methods proposed for DoD applications 
include the value of the currently employed resiliency method, such as the cost of the 
backup generators (Rickerson, Gillis, and Bulkeley 2019). Other methods to define a value 
for resiliency include using the cost to relocate the mission or buy services to complete the 
mission (Savena, Judson, and Pina 2017). 
Giraldez et al. (2012) develop a method which calculates mission impact of power 
loss. Their method defines a customer damage function (CDF) in terms of financial impact 
as a function of the length of outage. The method described by Giraldez et al. successfully 
captures the time dependent impact of a power loss in a way that the methods by Salmeron 
do not capture (Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick 2005). Giraldez et al. estimate the impact 
using a scenario-based method. Based on the reliability of the incoming power in terms of 
number of outages and length of outage, they calculate the total cost of power loss over 
time as value of electrical energy security (VEES). To define security benefits, the 
approach Giraldez et al. take is to use the probability of the loss of human life combined 
with the value of statistical life as defined by the Department of Transportation. VEES is 
the value of the resiliency benefits. Giraldez et al. state that those applying their method 
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would use the VEES to make to investment decisions and business case analyses for 
improving energy security. 
Van Broekhoven et al. (2012) present a method to compare different backup power 
architectures against the resiliency benefits. Their method considers the failure rate of the 
incoming utility power, failure rates of the components within the system, availability of 
PV generation, and load profiles. They use a probabilistic approach with Monte Carlo 
simulation for the generation and loads within the system to estimate load shedding. Their 
method estimates the life cycle cost for each architecture. Van Broekhoven et al. conclude 
that the results can identify the most desirable architectures and supply supporting data for 
cost/benefit decisions. 
3. Factors that Affect Resiliency 
Resiliency can be affected by common mode failures and supporting infrastructure. 
For instance, a hurricane is likely to cause widespread damage (Guikema, Quiring, and 
Han 2010; Brown 2008). Other supporting services to enable energy generation, such as 
diesel, natural gas, or water supplies and communication networks may be affected (The 
Gridwise Alliance 2013; NERC 2017; Hart et al. 2014). Extreme events can disrupt fuel 
resupply and the ability for onsite generators to continue to run (Ericson and Olis 2019) 
Nonfunctional interactions between subsystems can cause failure modes and effects 
beyond those initially anticipated, such as through physical damage (McIntire et al. 2016). 
One possibility of this for power systems is failure of components causing a fire which then 
damages further equipment and infrastructure (Parfomak 2014). An example of a 
nonfunctional interaction is the damage to power distribution equipment from a 
transformer fire as shown in Figure 3. Use of substitute commercial services or movement 
of mission between facilities may not be possible if those are also compromised. Facilities 
and components which are located adjacent to each other are more likely to be damaged 
together by a deliberate attack or accident (Angerholzer, Cilluffo, and Mahaffee 2014).  
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Figure 3. Power Transmission System Damage due to Transformer Fire 
The surrounding community can be a factor in resiliency for military installations. 
Restoration of power to critical local facilities such as hospitals may be prioritized over 
restoring power to the installation (Maliszewski and Perrings 2012). The military facility 
may also be called upon to support recovery efforts in the event of a severe event (CNA 
Military Advisory Board 2015). Fort Bragg conducted an unannounced test to test the 
reaction and resilience of the community to power loss (Price 2019). 
The supply of utility power and its vulnerability and reliability can also be an 
important consideration (IEEE 2007). The vulnerability of the system will affect the 
likelihood and duration of utility power loss (National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine 2017; Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick 2005). For instance, 
within Europe, the natural gas supplies used for some generation facilities are primarily 
from a potential adversary (Faas et al. 2011). In a conflict, these supplies could be disrupted 
as part of the military strategy (Hart et al. 2014). This threat is significant enough that this 
was codified in 2017 by P.L. 115–91, div. B, title XXVIII, §2880 and is part of the draft 
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National Defense Authorization Act for 2020 to reduce this susceptibility to a supply 
disruption (A. Smith 2019). 
Energy efficiency and the ability to shed noncritical loads affect resiliency by 
reducing the demand for power. Lowering demand eases the ability to meet the load during 
islanded operation (Rubenoff 2018). Direct control of loads may be used where it is 
unfeasible or uneconomical to implement load shedding by switches in the distribution 
system due to existing configuration constraints. This can be done via load controls that 
actively monitor the incoming power and dispatch the load when generation falls short 
(Vandoorn et al. 2011) 
C. STANDARDS 
The literature review investigates standards related to power system and 
microgrids. Existing standards can place constraints on the design or provide best guidance 
in building the architectures used for investigation and application of the methods 
developed here. When standards are missing or evolving, design and integration of a 
microgrid run a higher risk of encountering issues. 
Microgrid technology is relatively new and is maturing. Standards have been 
recently implemented which define standardized interfaces between the components and 
subsystems of the microgrid and between the microgrid and the utility grid. IEEE has 
created and updated the 1547 series of standards (Basso 2014). These include the IEEE 
1547 “Standard for Interconnection and Interoperability of Distributed Energy Resources 
with Associated Electric Power Systems Interfaces” (IEEE 2018b), which defines the 
behavior of various components within the microgrid to ensure safe and reliable operation 
and prevent negative affects to the utility grid it is connected to. Control interface standards 
were also recently implemented within IEEE standards 2030.7 and 2030.8 (Basso 2014) 
which are meant to enable interoperability among the various systems components and 
between the microgrid and utility grid. The IEEE 2030 series of standards are also being 
developed and implemented to define interface standards and improve interoperability of 
grid components and between the microgrid and utility grid (Burger 2018). IEEE 2030.7, 
the “IEEE Standard for the Specification of Microgrid Controllers,” was approved in 
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December of 2017, and the corresponding IEEE 2030.8, “IEEE Standard for the Testing of 
Microgrid Controllers,” was approved in June 2018 (IEEE 2018c; IEEE 2018d). Other 
standards, such as P2030.4, “Guide for Control and Automation Installations Applied to 
the Electric Power Infrastructure,” are still under active development status as of the date 
of this writing (IEEE 2017). 
D. MISSION IMPACT AND IMPORTANCE 
The resilience analysis and optimization methodology developed by this thesis 
depends on assigning a value to the mission achievement tied to the load. The literature 
review assesses existing research and guidance on assigning a mission value for various 
facilities and missions. The method developed and described in this thesis report 
incorporates elements of the methods and relevant considerations found during the 
literature review where applicable. 
NAVFAC develops and validates a method for assigning a mission dependency 
index (MDI) to facilities (Antelman and Miller 2002). The MDI method uses a series of 
question and computes a value based on the answer. MDI incorporates the time before an 
interruption would affect mission, the ability to relocate to another facility, and the inter-
dependency between missions. The NAVFAC method using MDI is currently in use per 
instruction promulgated by the Commander, Navy Installations Command (2018) and has 
also found application by the Army and NASA (Grussing et al. 2010; Gunderson et al. 
2010). Kujawski and Miller (2009) identify deficiencies in the MDI, such as 
inconsistencies in application, time dependency of corrective actions, and the MDI scoring 
equation. NAVFAC Public Works also identify deficiencies in the MDI method. The latest 
effort by NAVFAC HQ and the DON Resilient Energy Program Office (REPO) have been 
to use the Energy Security Assessment Tool (ESAT) tool and the Energy Mission 
Integration Group (EMIG) processes (B. Long, email to author, June 19, 2019; Kliem 2018; 
Tetatzin and Capozzoli 2018). The EMIG process consists of identifying gaps, prioritizing 
gaps and selection of solutions, and implements and verifies the solutions (Call 2019). The 
ESAT evaluates and scores facilities against the “3 pillars” of efficiency, resiliency, and 
reliability from the P-602 guidance (Tetatzin and Capozzoli 2018).  
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E. EXISTING DESIGN TOOLS 
The literature review also surveys existing design tools. Tool that are accessible are 
evaluated for potential application under this research. Although some of the tools found 
are useful for optimization of microgrid designs, none are utilized in this method developed 
under this thesis research. The evaluation found none of the existing tools incorporated the 
ability to optimize a design for mission accomplishment or could be readily modified to do 
so. Optimization methods described within the tools evaluated by this research did provide 
inspiration and guidance to the methods developed by this thesis research design for 
mission optimization. The tools evaluated fell under two general categories: 1) system 
optimization and 2) detailed electrical analysis tools. Table 1 summarized the tools 
evaluated. 
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Table 1. Summary of Microgrid Design Tools 
Tool Summary 
HOMER Pro Simulation and optimization tool. Exhaustive search of all possible combinations from set of possible equipment defined by user. 
DER-CAM 
Free for use. Optimizes investment based on objective function using 
a mixed-integer linear program (MILP). Input topology of the grid, 
investments considered, and with solar and wind resources available 
and electrical loads. Most appropriate for investment decisions 
analysis with payback. 
XENDEE Cloud based. Based on Open DSS/DER-CAM. Beta ended September 2018, was unavailable for evaluation. 
NREL REopt NREL internal use only, not able to evaluate. 
NREL REopt Lite 
Lite, web-based version of NREL REopt. Web based interface. 
Limited to only one load (e.g., building) without the ability to build a 
grid with various loads, sources, and grid infrastructure. Optimizes a 
cost function based on the value of load not met for investment in 
DER and batteries and for meeting resiliency objectives. It does 
output the load, generation, and battery storage state over the course 
of a year. It can also calculate the probability of meeting the critical 
load as a function of the time of the power outage. 
Sandia Microgrid Decision Tool 
(MDT) 
Similar capabilities to DER-CAM. Define the reliability, cost, and 
other properties of each element in the grid. Set the different possible 
specifications of each element in system and optimizes based on 
objective functions. Can optimize for objectives amount of fuel used, 
time loads are met, cost, CO2, etc. Most complete and comprehensive 
optimization tool found for the purposes of exploring business cases 
and reliability/resiliency objectives for different architectures. 
Sandia ES-Select Tool 
Assists in evaluation of electrical energy storage technologies and 
feasibility Treats uncertainties in technical and financial parameters 
as statistical distributions. Licensed for public use. 
MATLAB Simulink General modeling tool that has components for electrical and power systems design. 
Open DSS 
Object based programming. Command line based. Can integrate with 
other packages such as MATLAB and Python. GUI for typing in code 
to build and run model and see results. 
Power Analytics Paladin 
DesignBase 
Highly accurate simulation for power modeling. Single line design. 
Includes “what if” capabilities for alternatives. 
GridLAB-D Free and Open Source. Object based programming. Command line based for integration into other packages. PNNL/DOE Developed. 
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DER-CAM uses an OR approach to optimize the design of a microgrid using a 
mixed-integer linear program (MILP) (LBNL 2016). The user enters the microgrid design 
and solar and wind resources available and data on loads and electrical supply (LBNL 
2018). The user also inputs the specifications of the various distributed energy resources 
(DER) being considered, which include distributed generators and energy storage systems 
(LBNL 2018). DER-CAM optimizes the selection, placement, and use of DER based on a 
cost objective function (LBNL 2016). This research performed only a limited assessment 
of the tool. It crashed when attempting to execute the optimization solver without any error 
message to help guide a possible fix to the model. DER-CAM was used for the CERTS 
microgrid concept which defined the modern microgrid concept (Lasseter et al. 2002; 
Marnay and Bailey 2004). This review concludes DER-CAM is most appropriate for 
investment decision analysis with payback. 
The Sandia Microgrid Design Toolkit (MDT) also uses an OR approach with a 
MILP (Sandia National Lab 2017). This evaluation found it appeared to offer similar 
capabilities to DER-CAM. The reliability, cost, volume, and other properties of each 
element such as generators, PV array, grid connections, and battery storage are input as a 
set the different possible specifications for each element in system (Sandia National Lab 
2017). The tool then optimizes the design based on objective functions (Arguello et al. 
2015). This tool offered more flexibility and a more holistic design goal. The evaluation 
found it allowed for optimization of multiple objectives such as amount of fuel used, time 
loads are met, and cost. The software did exhibit stability issues and crashing which limited 
the depth of the evaluation and consideration for use under this research. This was the most 
complete and comprehensive optimization tool found and included resiliency metrics in 
the optimizing. The DoD Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability 
and Security program used the MDT during the design and analysis of a microgrid system 
(Leewright 2012; Sandia National Lab 2017). 
The MATLAB Simulink tool was evaluated using IEEE test feeder models 
available as built in samples. The Simscape Electrical component library allows for 
detailed design inputs and highly accurate simulation of the voltage and current flows 
(MathWorks 2019). This tool was not used as it simulated the electrical components to a 
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level of detail well beyond the needs for assessment at the architecture level. This tool 
would be valuable for when more detailed modeling is necessary but is not appropriate for 
fast evaluation of a microgrid behavior over a timeframe of days and weeks. 
Open DSS and GridLAB-D are object oriented, command-line based tools, which 
offered highly accurate power modeling (Electric Power Research Institute 2019; PNNL 
2017). Like Simulink, these tools offered modeling at timescales and accuracies beyond 
what was deemed necessary for the resiliency evaluation methods developed under this 
research. They also had steep learning curves due to their general-purpose nature and lack 
of a graphical interface to offer building of the grid architecture via as a single line diagram. 
XENDEE appeared to offer a more user-friendly interface to Open DSS but was not 
available for evaluation at the time of this research (Xendee Corporation 2019). 
HOMER Pro is a commercial software and the capabilities listed indicated it offers 
comprehensive tools for the design, analysis, and optimization of a microgrid (HOMER 
Energy LLC 2019). It was not evaluated due to licensing cost, gaps in capabilities desired 
under this research, and proprietary nature of the program which does not allow for 
modification. The optimization is based on a “proprietary “derivative free” optimization 
algorithm which searches to “find the least cost combination of equipment for consistently 
meeting the electric load” (Walker 2016, para 1, 3). The software could not be applied with 
the methodology used under this research due to the lack of an objective beyond cost and 
inability to modify the program for a mission objective. 
Other software tools found included the National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
(NREL) REopt and REopt Lite, and the Sandia ES-Select Tool. REopt was not available 
for use by other organizations and could not be evaluated or applied under this research 
(NREL 2019a). The REopt Lite tool is a simplified version available via a web interface 
on the NREL website (NREL 2019b). Both cost and resilience objectives were available. 
Load, site location, outage duration and time, and component details are among the 
available inputs. The resilience objective sizes the system to meet the critical load during 
the outage duration (NREL 2019b). The output included a recommended PV and battery 
size, power flow profiles of the battery, generation, and loads, and cost data. An example 
power flow graph from the output report is shown in Figure 4. REopt Lite is limited to a 
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single load, does not allow for defining a grid layout, and is only available via a web 
interface. These limitations precluded this tool from being applicable under the 
methodology developed here. The Sandia ES-Select Tool provides recommendations for 
energy storage based on the application (KEMA n.d.). Although it could provide 
recommendations on energy storage technologies for evaluation, it is limited in scope and 
was not utilized in the methodology employed under this research. Siritoglou (2019) 
develops a tool for sizing a standalone power system using a PV and battery. His tool is 
limited to one load, PV array, and ESS, but it is open source and could be modified to or 
incorporated into other tools. 
 
Figure 4. Example REopt Lite Output 
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
The approach of this research performed under this thesis report falls into the 
“design thesis” and “analysis thesis” research methods (Giachetti 2016, 3). The overall 
objective of this research is to develop models and methodologies that will improve system 
design and analysis of microgrid systems. The focus of this research is on reliability and 
resiliency requirements of a microgrid. The methodology and tool are then applied to 
analyze a conceptual microgrid. The resulting models and methods and lessons learned 
could then be applied to other design projects. 
This research begins with a system analysis and building of a system model. This 
first step clarifies the overall functionality of the system and the factors which affect its 
design, operation, and resiliency (Buede 2016). The system analysis and model clarify 
understanding of the system, its operational context, functional objective, and functional 
decomposition (Buede 2016). This thesis research then applies the knowledge and insight 
from the system analysis phase towards building the methods for quantifying and 
optimizing the resilience of the system. 
The research proceeds with method and simulation model development. The 
methods are developed with the goal of optimizing the system for the functionality 
identified during the system analysis phase. The methods developed are then demonstrated 
by applying them in a case study to a notional microgrid. The case study first applies the 
methods to a baseline design. It continues by exploring various elements and configurations 
of the system to determine how they impact resiliency. The case study presented here 
demonstrates the method and its value. 
A. SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
Understanding the system from the functional perspective is required to understand 
how that system may fail to function. A system engineering analysis can identify and 
clarify the functional requirements of the system, as presented by Buede (2016). The 
functional decomposition and system model identifies the each of the lower level functions 
necessary for the overall system to operate and the relationships and flows between each 
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of those functions (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011; Buede 2016). This allows for 
identification of possible functional failure modes which those designing and analyzing the 
system can use to identify the effects on the system and drive the risk analysis (Jensen, 
Tumer, and Kurtoglu 2009). 
1. Microgrid System Engineering Perspective 
A system engineer considers the entire system in its use context and interfacing 
system, through its entire life cycle, in terms of meeting the needs of the stakeholders, as 
discussed by Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011). They present that the set of system-level 
requirements is generated from these needs and operational use. They further state that 
other system requirements may come from regulatory requirements. Blanchard and 
Fabrycky describe how the SE process proceeds with generation of derived requirements, 
measures of effectiveness, and measures of suitability which are decomposed from the 
system level requirement and guide the detailed design activities and verification and 
validation of the system. 
The first step in the system analysis is to determine the problem that needs to be 
solved. This is an important first step in determining the true requirements of the system, 
as the need as originally stated may not reflect the true need of the stakeholders or may not 
be well defined, as discussed by Sage and Rouse (2009) and Blanchard and Fabrycky 
(2011). For a microgrid, this step entails understanding what problem the stakeholders are 
trying to solve with a microgrid. The authors contend that a good understanding of the 
problem is important to generation of a well-defined set of requirements and measures of 
effectiveness. Otherwise, it is possible to have a well-designed system that fails because it 
does not solve the correct problem (Sage and Rouse 2009). 
Understanding the system context is another important aspect (Buede 2016). This 
defines the environment the system must operate within, the way it will be used, and the 
external disruptions to which it must respond (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011; Buede 2016). 
Designing to survive a major storm or attack, which has very low likelihood, and 
optimizing the design to meet that metric, could result in a system that ultimately provides 
less energy security against more likely and common threats. Failed components, 
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accidents, vandalism, or an unreliable utility power supply all threaten energy security (ICF 
International 2016; Office of Technology Assessment 1990; Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command 2016). The probability and consequences of these threats determine the best 
design alternatives. The context also identifies the supporting systems and activities, which 
are necessary for operation and affect resiliency. One such activity is maintenance, which 
can result in common cause failures due to faulty maintenance procedures or poor training 
(IEEE 2018a). 
The system analysis should be able to answer the questions: 
• Is a microgrid a good solution for the need identified? 
• Is “resiliency” the right metric, and if so, how is that metric defined and 
what is the right objective? 
If the initial customer problem is stated as achieving a certain number of days of 
autonomy via a microgrid, and the need is ultimately found to be overall energy security, 
then other possible solutions can be explored given constraints. Resilience could be 
maximized by improving the utility power reliability through agreement with the utility 
power provider, as presented by Kueck (2005). It may be possible to pay for energy security 
as part of a utility service with a guaranteed minimum service reliability or to achieve 
improved service reliability through redundant feeds and substations (NAVFAC Northwest 
2018; Kueck 2005). Energy security can also be improved through improvement to the 
distribution system and equipment The NAVFAC P-602 provides guidance to consider 
such approaches to achieve cost effective energy security (Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command 2017). Resources are finite, and a holistic approach to maximizing overall 
energy security with the available resources is ideal (Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command 2018). If investment in a microgrid compromises funding for maintenance and 
repair of the related systems and leaves a system with older components more likely to fail, 
then energy security is not improved. Repair and maintenance have a considerable impact 
on power system reliability (IEEE 2007). The system perspective considers not just the 
system itself, but the entire life cycle and operation which is necessary to meet 
stakeholders’ needs (Sage and Rouse 2009; Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). 
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2. Microgrid Stakeholders 
Identification and classification of the stakeholders provides essential information 
which is used to define the functional and operational requirements of the system and the 
hierarchy of importance of competing requirements (Sage and Rouse 2009; Langford 
2012). Well-defined and understood top-level requirements will generate meaningful 
system metrics for verification and validation of the system (Sage and Rouse 2009). 
Generating these requirements involves engaging with stakeholders, understanding the 
requirements of the system for each stakeholder, and clarification of functional and 
operational needs (Buede 2016). This stakeholder engagement is also key to helping the 
stakeholders understand their functional needs and opening the possible design space 
beyond a possible preconceived solution (B. Long, email to author, June 19, 2019). Under 
this research, the stakeholders are classified as either primary, secondary, or tertiary based 
on their level of interaction with the system (Sharp, Finkelstein, and Galal 1999). Table 2 
gives a summary of the stakeholders identified under this system analysis and their 
classification. 
Table 2. Microgrid Stakeholders 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Facilities/Personnel Electrical Utility Installers 
Facilities Manager Supply system/personnel 
Equipment 
manufacturers 
Utilities Manager Maintenance activities Surrounding Community 
Ownera   
Installera   
aApplicable to third-party financed microgrids 
 
For a microgrid system, this thesis identifies the primary stakeholders as the persons 
within the facilities receiving power from the system (Chief of Naval Operations 2012). 
Their mission requirements determine what the overall loads are within the microgrid and 
which loads are critical loads, which must be met when the microgrid is operating in island 
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mode (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2016). These primary stakeholders also 
determine the contribution to mission accomplishment for each load and the hierarchy of 
importance for loads (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2016; Commander Navy 
Installations Command 2018). This information is necessary to identify load-shedding 
strategies which will maximize mission accomplishment when available power is limited 
during contingency operations. These stakeholders can also identify contingency 
information such as which loads could possibly be met by other means or at alternate 
facilities (Antelman and Miller 2002). For DoD microgrid systems, the facility manager 
and utility manager for the installation is also classified as a primary stakeholder. They are 
typically responsible for the infrastructure within the installation, to include acquisition 
and life cycle support, which serves the needs of the commands located on in the 
installation (U.S. DOE n.d.; Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2018). 
Secondary stakeholders identified include the utility power provider and supply and 
maintenance personnel and systems. The utility providers determine constraints for 
integration at the point of common coupling, such power supply limitations, power quality, 
disconnection and reconnection parameters, and ability and limitations on exporting excess 
power back to the utility grid (Stadler et al. 2016; Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
2016). Others include the supply systems and maintenance personnel. They will determine 
the availability of spare components and the ability and timelines to perform inspection, 
maintenance, diagnostics and repair of the system (Buede 2016). 
Tertiary stakeholders may include installers and equipment manufacturers. They 
will be involved during the initial fielding of the system (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). 
Equipment manufacturers may be required to provide interface data and coordinate with 
other manufacturers through the system design to enable the components to interoperate 
with each other (Buede 2016). Equipment manufacturers may maintain continued 
involvement through the operation life cycle to maintain, repair, and update the system 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). The surrounding community can also be a tertiary 
stakeholder due to interdependencies between the facilities within the installation and the 
community (Hart et al. 2014) 
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In the case of a system that is procured using alternative financing methods, 
additional important stakeholders will exist. Under a purchase power agreement 
arrangement, the system is procured, owned, operated, and maintained by a private entity 
(U.S. Navy Office of Information 2012). Power is then sold to the installation under an 
agreement. This entity would be a primary stakeholder, has vested financial interest, and 
high level of interaction with the system. Procurement and operational costs affect the 
financial viability and profitability of the arrangement. If an energy savings performance 
contracts (ESPCs) or utility energy service contracts (UESCs) is utilized, the upfront cost 
is borne by a third party and the financial benefit is paid for via the life cycle cost savings 
(ODASD(IE) 2018). This third party has financial interest in the upfront and operational 
costs of the system. 
3. Microgrid System Functional Model 
To understand the microgrid from the systems engineering perspective, this 
analysis develops a system model. The model identifies the system functions, interactions 
between the different functions, the system context, and the external systems with which 
the microgrid interacts. The microgrid system model also includes use case scenarios for 
the various system states. The system model assists in understanding the functionality of 
the system, how the system will be used, potential stakeholders and their interaction with 
the system, and how the system would operate under different scenarios. The 
understanding gained from the system model informs the risk assessment by identifying 
which functions and interactions may be lost, and what scenarios should be evaluated in 
the risk assessment (Jensen, Tumer, and Kurtoglu 2009). The system model also helps 
identify how to optimize the system architecture by identifying the requirements and value 
of the system from the stakeholders’ perspectives (Sage and Rouse 2009). 
Understanding the external context for the system provided important information 
to define the requirements (Buede 2016) Some derived requirements are affected by 
external systems and the environment. The external utility is one such example. It provides 
the external power that the microgrid relies on during normal operation, and the microgrid 
must guard against the loss of this power negatively affecting function. A microgrid that 
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must be resilient while receiving power from a utility that has frequent but short duration 
power loss will differ from a microgrid that must protect against the threat of an infrequent 
but long-term loss of power loss due to a natural disaster. The operating environment is 
also an important consideration. It will dictate the availability and reliability of renewable 
energy sources and loads at the facilities (Keesee 2018). It also defines the environmental 
conditions the system must be able to withstand. 
The external context also identifies the system boundaries to understand what is 
part of the system and within the design control of the systems engineer (Buede 2016). For 
the system model presented here and used within the research, all subsystems are 
considered to be under design control. However, in a system that is being integrated into 
existing infrastructure, this may not be true or only true in part. The existing infrastructure 
may be considered an external system, which interacts with and must be integrated with 
the microgrid (Naval Facilities Engineering Command 2016). The power distribution 
system is commonly already installed, and it may limit the ability to separate critical loads 
from noncritical load where a shared power feed is utilized (B. Long, email to author, June 
19, 2019). Existing distribution system components can also impose transmission capacity 
limits between connections within the system. Other components such as existing PV, ESS, 
or other microgrid systems may exist. This is exemplified by the Miramar microgrid system 
which already had a 1.6 MW PV system, 3.2 MW generator powered by landfill methane 
gas, and a small battery and PV for one facility which was already able to operate in island 
mode (Wood 2016). 
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Figure 6. Microgrid F0 IDEF0 
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research explores a design and assessment methodology for optimizing the 
microgrid architecture to maximize mission achievement. The method is risk based, 
accounting for the total set of potential threats to energy security and the uniqueness of that 
set of threats at each location. The microgrid is approached from the system engineering 
and high-level system architecture perspective. The design and analysis focus on the 
functional requirements and value from the stakeholders’ perspective. As such, the 
objective to maximize mission accomplishment is the goal of the methodology in this 
research. 
The reference methods presented in this research allow for assessing the reliability 
and resiliency of an existing microgrid system or designs under consideration. It can also 
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be used to guide design decisions when developing the system architecture for a new 
microgrid system. The methodology can also be incorporated into a new microgrid design 
tool under development to simplify and automate the methods developed in this research. 
1. Research Objective 
The objective of this research is to optimize the system architecture to maximize 
mission achievement from the loads supplied by the microgrid. Within the methodology 
implemented in this research, this objective becomes the minimization of disruption to 
mission over the sum of possible scenarios. 
Prior research and analysis performed on microgrids do not support the mission 
focused objective. The methods and tools developed by Salmeron, Wood, and Ross (2003) 
within the “Optimizing Electric Grid Design Under Asymmetric Threat” series of reports 
does allow for assignment of a cost of load curtailment for each customer sector on each 
bus. Others could modify the cost impact of the load shed to a mission impact within the 
formulation. The formulation did consider the repair times to determine the overall impact 
over time (Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick 2004). However, this method has shortfalls for 
the objectives in this research. It assigns a cost function to the generation at each bus which 
is at odds with the objective of maximizing and determining resiliency. The formulation is 
also built to identify the components of the highest value for attack. It does not account for 
other risks and failure modes such as component failures or storm events which could lead 
to load shedding or failure of the system. The formulation is also unable to optimize against 
a set of defined risks to optimize against all possible scenarios. Additionally, the method 
and formulation are built around a large transmission system. They do not account for 
elements typical in a microgrid such as diesel generators, renewable generation sources, or 
energy storage systems. Renewable generation sources have output which varies over time 
and can be intermittent (Díaz-González, Sumper, and Gomis-Bellmunt 2016). Diesel 
generators rely on fuel and have finite fuel reserves (Ericson and Olis 2019). The 
formulation and tool developed do not allow for these considerations. Salmeron, Wood, 
and Ross also do not allow for demand variation over time or demand reductions when 
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only critical loads are powered, which is necessary to capture the reaction of an islanded 
microgrid system. 
Other research and tools optimize the microgrid design with the objective of 
minimizing the amount of load shed or unmet demand. These methods fail to account for 
the impact resulting from unmet demand. For instance, a recent loss of power of only 13 
minutes at a flash memory production facility resulted in the loss of an estimated 50% of 
quarterly output (Shilov 2019). A similar event in 2018, a 30-minute loss of power at a 
flash fabrication facility, resulted in the loss equivalent to 11% of the company’s monthly 
output (Shilov 2018). At the University of California, San Diego, a momentary power 
disruption results in the need to recalibrate the electron microscope, which takes six weeks 
(Cohn 2014). At the LAX airport, it took 1.5 hours for the TSA to reboot systems after 
power was restored (Cosgrove and Lee 2019). For other critical loads, such as HVAC 
loads, a short loss of power may result in no impact in most cases. 
2. Research Scope 
Although an imbalance of loads between the three phases is a design factor, it is 
not considered under this research. Power within a distribution system is typically three-
phase, consisting of three current carrying wires and one neutral (Short 2004). Load 
balancing between each of the three phases is assumed to fall under the detailed system 
design. The system optimization tools found and OR research on power systems, as 
discussed in the literature review of this thesis, also assumed either a single phase or DC 
power flow equivalent. These assumptions are typical of power flow studies (Murty 2017) 
Loss of a single transformer or transmission line associated with it could cause only partial 
loss of power within a facility depending on the configuration of the distribution system 
(Short 2004). Within this research, this failure mode and effect is not considered. A loss of 
one transformer is assumed to cause loss of power to the entire facility. This assumption is 
conservative for calculating the reliability and resilience of the system. It still allows for an 
effective comparison of different system architectures during the early design and 
evaluation portion. When detailed system design proceeds, configurations that allow for 
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the system to continue operation in a degraded manner when components fail instead of 
losing all power should be considered to maximize system resiliency. 
This research does not consider failure modes that could occur due to emergent 
behavior of the control system and transmission system. This includes items such as 
cascading shutdown due to electrical transients and protective mechanisms tripping 
(Brown 2008; Čepin 2011). The identification and quantification of these risk elements and 
the subsequent activities to mitigate them are left for the detailed design phase. 
3. Method Description 
This section describes the overall steps and method developed by this research. The 
method determines the expected total mission impact over the lifetime of the system. A 
system engineer, facility manager, or utility manager applying this method can then 
compare the mission impact of different architectures to evaluate design tradeoffs, compare 
the sensitivity of each architecture to potential threats, and optimize the design for mission 
achievement. Figure 7 presents a flowchart of the steps defined in the method description, 
which are detailed in the following paragraphs. Table 3 presents a summary of the gaps in 
present methods and tools identified that this method attempts to address. The “Literature 
Review” chapter of this thesis discusses the existing tools and methods in more detail. 
 
Figure 7. Method Steps Flowchart 
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Table 3. Summary of Surveyed Tools and Methods and Gaps 
Tool/Method Gaps 
HOMER Pro Proprietary software. Cost optimization only. 
DER-CAM Cost focused objectives. No consideration for mission impact or optimization. 
NREL REopt NREL internal use only. 
NREL REopt Lite One load only, limited resiliency objectives. Inability to tie to mission impact. 
Sandia Microgrid Decision Tool 
(MDT) No ability to optimize for mission impact. 
Open DSS No mission impact assessment built in. Unnecessary high-fidelity for assessment of resiliency at system level. 
GridLAB-D No mission impact assessment built in. Unnecessary high-fidelity for assessment of resiliency at system level. 
Petri. Cost of load loss optimization, not mission 
Sánchez-Mateos Cost of load loss optimization, not mission 
Fard et al. Load not met optimization, not mission. 
Ulmer Load not met optimization, not mission. 
Bahramirad, Reder, and Khodaei Cost of load loss optimization, not mission 
NASA PRA Lack of time and state dependence on failure to function 
 
a. Step 1: Define Critical Loads and Mission for Each Facility 
The facility manager first defines the values of the mission achievement and total 
and critical load for each facility. This can be a single number for each facility, or the 
mission achievement can be a function of the load to account for the variety of missions 
performed at each facility and the ability to partially discontinue portions of the mission 
for load shedding. They evaluate if the mission can be delayed, moved to other facilities, 
or achieved via alternative means in the event of a power disruption. Also, one must 
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consider if mission could be impacted by factors other than power loss at the facility, such 
as loss of other utilities such as gas or water (Petit et al. 2015). 
b. Step 2: Generate the Set of Scenarios 
The facility manager then generates the set of scenarios S  that could disrupt the 
power supply and estimates the probability of each occurring over the course of a year, 
here denoted as ( )Pr S s  for each specific scenario s . Events for equipment failure 
should use historical data if available (U.S. DOE n.d.). Historical data will supply the most 
accurate and relevant data for that location as the probability of events is highly dependent 
on location and application. This step should also consider the impacts of other systems 
and factors upon which the microgrid is reliant. For instance, fuel deliveries may be 
disrupted which affects the ability to continue to use generators once fuel storage is 
exhausted. For scenarios where the probability is hard to quantify, such as infrequent 
natural disasters or targeted attacks, a best estimate or likely range of probabilities can be 
used. The system analysis can vary the probabilities within the system model to determine 
the sensitivity of mission impacted against that threat. The results can guide further 
exploration and design decisions. 
c. Step 3: Determine the Recovery Time 
The facility manager then determines the recovery time of each piece within the 
microgrid. This can be a probability distribution to account for the variation in repair times, 
and scenario dependent. The repair times during a natural disaster will likely be higher than 
those during equipment failure due to widespread impact in the area and availability of 
resources to perform repairs. 
d. Step 4: Map Power Lost to Mission Impact 
The next step is to map the disruption of power to an amount of mission impacted 
as a function of the amount and time of load shed. This mapping should be scenario based 
to capture the impact as a function of load shed and time. For some critical loads, a 
momentary loss of power could lead to significant impact, and further load loss does not 
cause further loss beyond the extra time to reestablish power (IEEE 2007). This method is 
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similar to the customer damage function (CDF) method (Giraldez et al. 2012) discussed in 
the literature review section. The difference between the CDF and the method developed 
in this research is the focus on the impact to mission achievement, not financial impact. 
e. Step 5: Simulate the System 
The facility manager simulates the system using the model. The model generates 
the impact of each event in terms mission impact. It determines the load shedding and 
behavior of the system and facilities, and then calculates the mission impact using the 
function mapped in the previous step. Since load shedding and subsequent mission impact 
varies depending on conditions, demand, and starting state of the system, this research uses 
a Monte Carlo simulation for each scenario. The mean mission impact over all iterations 
of the Monte Carlo simulation, sM , quantifies the expected mission impact over that 
specific scenario s . 
f. Step 6: Calculate the Total Mission Impact 
The facility manager calculates the total impact of disruption events over the 
expected lifetime of the system, defined here as expected life cycle mission impact (ELMI). 
This quantifies the resiliency of the system against all expected threats and disruptions. 








The ELMI contribution from a single scenario may also be calculated, defined in 
this thesis as: 
 ( )s sELMI Pr S s M≡ =  (2) 
Inspection of sELMI  could prove useful in determining which scenarios contribute 
most to the overall ELMI. 
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g. Step 7: Analyze Results 
Finally, the facility manager inspects the results to uncover the main drivers of 
mission impact and evaluates possible changes to the system configuration, specifications, 
or operation to minimize those effects. Inspection of the contribution of each scenario to 
ELMI informs the manager which scenarios or probabilities contribute most. The user 
iterates the analysis for different architectures as required, generating the ELMI for 
alternate designs for comparison. Estimated costs associated with these different 
architectures can also be used to define a trade space between costs and resiliency and 
narrow the choices to the most preferable options. 
4. Modeling Approach 
This research creates a representative microgrid system for a microgrid system 
located on a DoD installation for use in verifying the simulation model and validating the 
methodology. Figure 8 shows the one-line diagram of the baseline microgrid system used 
in this research. The system includes the following elements commonly found in existing 
microgrid systems: 
• distributed generation in the form of diesel generators and a PV array 
• energy storage in the form of a chemical battery 
• a connection to the utility grid through a substation 
• a distribution system made up of a mix of overhead and underground lines 
along with switches and transformers 
• facilities of various uses and sizes 
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Figure 8. Baseline Microgrid System One-Line Diagram 
The resiliency analysis of the overall system is performed using a system model 
that simulates the behavior of the system under different scenarios. The model determines 
the power flow within the system, the pertinent states of the equipment within the system 
such as the battery state, PV power being generated, and functional state of the components 
that make up the microgrid. The model records demand not met and required load shedding 
and calculates the resulting impact to mission. Power demanded at each facility and PV 
power generated are stochastic and time dependent. A Monte Carlo simulation of the model 
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for each scenario is used to capture the probability distribution of mission impact for each 
possible disruption. 
This thesis initially assessed the use of probabilistic risk assessment, including the 
use of reliability block diagrams (RBD) and event trees, for the risk and resiliency analysis 
portion of this research (Stamatelatos et al. 2011). The assessment did not find those 
methods adequately enable assessment of the risk and consequences of failure of 
components within a microgrid on their own. The methods cannot adequately represent the 
consequences of a functional loss within the system due to time and state dependent nature 
of the impact. For instance, a loss of the inverter for the ESS could cause no impact if PV 
and generator energy production is able to meet demand. However, if the failure occurs 
during a time when it is cloudy and power output from the PV array is low, this may then 
lead to load shedding. In this case, the system continues to operate in a degraded manner. 
The RBD method failures to consider this partial functionality. Another failure mode could 
be one of the generators. Properly sized, the ESS could fill in for the lost generator. 
However, after some time, the stored energy will be exhausted and lead to load shedding. 
The effect of the failure is dependent on the time between the failure and restoration of the 
generator functionality and the charge remaining in the ESS at the time the generator fails. 
Again, the classic RBD does not factor this time dependence on the effect of the failure. 
5. Simulation Model Implementation 
The simulation model used by the research within this thesis is implemented via a 
set of MATLAB scripts, which are provided in the Appendix. Data for loads and solar 
incidence is imported into the MATLAB model from the databases. The steps taken within 
the simulation model are described in the following paragraphs. 
The simulation model estimates power flow within the system using a discrete 
hourly time-step of the loads, PV generation, generator demand, battery demand and charge 
state, and flow of power within the grid. The model determines power flow within the grid 
using a linear network flow model with generation balanced against load (Hillier and 
Lieberman 2015). This research concluded that this level of system model fidelity 
effectively determined the resilience and reliability measures of effectiveness of interest 
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from the system engineering perspective for the purposes of assessing different system 
architectures during the top-level system design. Others could extend the model to be more 
comprehensive using more detailed design data such as cable length, construction, and 
routing, and electrical data on switching and conversion elements in the system. This extra 
data would enable calculation of the real and reactive power flows within a distribution 
system with parallel flow paths between nodes using DC power flow approximations and 
assumption, such as that proposed by Bolognani and Zampieri (2016). The DC power flow 
method is used within the DER-CAM software tool for solving multi-nodal microgrids 
topologies (LBNL 2018). The software solves for real and reactive power and optimizes 
placement of power generating resources. 
The simulation model defines the demand at each facility using hourly load data 
from the commercial reference buildings from the DOE (U.S. DOE EERE 2012). The 
reference buildings consist of 16 building types and which represent approximately 70% 
of the buildings within the United States and is intended for use for building energy studies. 
The DOE data set contains electrical and natural gas demands for each of the 16 building 
types over 16 different climate zones within the United States (Deru et al. 2011). The data 
includes electrical demand at hourly intervals for ventilation, HVAC, lighting, and 
equipment over the course of full calendar year. During island mode operation, the model 
modifies the demand profiles to only power critical loads. Table 4 provides an excerpt of 
this data for a medium-sized office building. 
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Table 4. DOE Medium Office Building Hourly Load Excerpt. Source: U.S. 























01:00:00 33.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 16.1 
01/01 
02:00:00 35.1 0.2 0.0 1.3 2.7 16.1 
01/01 
03:00:00 39.2 0.8 0.0 4.9 2.7 16.1 
01/01 
04:00:00 39.6 0.8 0.0 5.3 2.7 16.1 
01/01 
05:00:00 42.3 1.0 0.0 7.7 2.7 16.1 
01/01 
06:00:00 41.0 0.8 0.0 6.7 2.7 16.1 
01/01 
07:00:00 44.3 1.0 0.0 9.7 2.7 16.1 
01/01 
08:00:00 32.2 0.8 0.0 7.7 2.7 16.1 
01/01 
09:00:00 26.9 1.0 0.0 7.1 2.7 16.1 
01/01 
10:00:00 23.0 0.8 0.0 3.4 2.7 16.1 
 
 
The model calculates the amount of PV power generated using solar incidence 
received at the ground and PV area and efficiency. Solar incidence data from the National 
Solar Radiation Data Base (NREL 2010) represents the amount of solar power received by 
the PV panels. The NREL solar incidence data is also presented in hourly intervals over an 
entire calendar year, similar to the format of the data used for facility demand. The database 
contains estimates based on several different solar incidence models (Wilcox 2012). The 
simulation model implemented in this research uses the data from the SUNY model, which 
estimates actual ground level solar incidence based on satellite measurements (Wilcox 
2012). Figure 9 provides a plot of two weeks of extracted data from this dataset. Due to 
being based on real historical measurements, this research believes SUNY model dataset 
generates a reasonable approximation of expected PV output and variability for expected 
environmental conditions. The user defines the PV size and efficiency as an input to the 
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simulation model. This allows the user to vary these properties to determine the impacts 
they have on the resiliency of the system over the possible scenarios. 
 
Figure 9. SUNY Solar Incidence Data. Adapted from NREL (2010). 
The user can input the properties of the energy storage systems (ESS) in the model. 
The properties of charge and discharge efficiency, overall capacity, and maximum charge 
and discharge rate are available as inputs. The model calculates and records the charge 
state of the ESS at each time step. This allows the user to ascertain the potential amount of 
oversizing or under sizing of the ESS depending upon the desired resiliency objective. The 
amount of time the battery is exhausted is also recorded within the summary of results. 
Figure 10 presents an example of the output from the simulation model during a two-week 
island mode operation. In this example, the battery is exhausted for a significant percentage 
of the simulation, indicating generation or battery storage is inadequate. 
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Figure 10. Example Plot of ESS Charge Level during Simulation 
User-defined values for the generators are maximum output capacity and fuel 
supply and efficiency available for each generator within the system. The model records 
the amount of fuel in each supply tank over the course of the simulation. The user can alter 
the fuel resupply amounts and timing for each generator for each scenario of interest. This 
allows the user to generate model results for potential disruptions to the fuel resupply and 
determine the response of the system and the impact to meeting loads and performing the 
mission. The amount of time each generator fuel level is empty is recorded and included 
in the results summary. 
Given the demand at each facility and the state of the microgrid, the power flow at 
each time step is calculated. The model implements the strategies defined within, such as 
the utilization of battery power versus generators to meet demand. The user may vary these 
strategies to determine their effects on the resiliency of the system. Where load must be 
shed, the model records the effect of that load shedding on mission objectives as a function 
of the amount of load shed, time of the load shedding, and facility which had unmet 
demand. 
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The simulation implements failures or attacks using the functional state of each of 
the components within the system. The functional state of each line between nodes within 
the microgrid may be user-defined as an input to the simulation. This allows the user to 
define a scenario of interest for the simulation, such as failure of multiple elements for a 
set amount of time. The functional states may be automatically generated stochastically 
using reliability data for each of the components within the microgrid and the associated 
repair times. The user may also generate the states manually to define a scenario of interest. 
This simulation model implements a Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the overall risk 
and effects given the stochastic nature of load and PV generation. The user can vary the 
failure rates and repair times to capture the sensitivity of the grid resilience to different 
factors. This informs the system designer by allowing them to evaluate different types of 
equipment and sparing and repair strategies to be used when operating the system to 
maximize its resiliency. Table 5 presents the summary of inputs and outputs in the 
simulation model. 
Table 5. Simulation Model Inputs and Outputs 
Input Output 
Generator size Power flow 
Generator fuel storage, resupply probability and 
timing Generator fuel level 
ESS storage and maximum output ESS state of charge 
PV array area and efficiency Mission impact 
Map of load shed to mission impact  
Hourly facility loads  
Functional state of each component a  
Failed component and recovery time a  
Solar incidence  
a optional 
 
This research uses reliability block diagrams (RBD) to calculate the probability of 
failures for each connection within the model. This method proved suitable for defining 
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the overall reliability of a connection from the components that make up that connection. 
For each connection from node to node, this research used a reliability block diagram 
combined with the failure rate for each of the constituent components on that connection 
to calculate the overall reliability of the connection. Where parallel connections exist, the 
method considers only one line, and modifies the probability using two identical lines in 
parallel to calculate the probability of occurrence, as presented in the power grid reliability 
analysis methods presented by Singh, Jirutitijaroen, and Mitra (2019). 
Within the RBD, the reliability, R, of each component is calculate from time, t, and 
failure rate, λ, as: 
 tR e λ−=  (3) 
The reliability over the entire RBD is then calculated using the failure rate of each 
component in series within the diagram. Where components are in series within the 
diagram, the reliability is the product of the reliability of each such that 1,2 1 2R R R= . Where 
components are in parallel, the reliability is calculated as 1,2 1 21 [(1 )(1 )]R R R= − − − . 
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IV. RESEARCH RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the design, modeling, and simulation efforts 
performed on a representative microgrid as a case study. The case study applies the 
methodologies and simulation models developed under this effort. This chapter provides 
an example and template for the methods and demonstrates the validity and value of the 
approach of the methods developed by this thesis. The demonstration presented in the 
following sections illustrates how a facility manager could apply this method to evaluate 
alternative architectures and components and guide decision making and analysis. 
A. BASELINE MICROGRID DESIGN DESCRIPTION 
Figure 8 presents the initial microgrid system used to validate and demonstrate the 
methodology and simulation model. The microgrid system also serves as the baseline 
architecture. The baseline microgrid consists of two electrical buses connected to each 
other, with the utility grid connection at bus one. A summary of the facilities within the 
microgrid is shown in Table 6. The facilities are derived from commercial reference 
buildings provided by the DOE (2011). A total of three facilities are connected to bus one, 
denoted as EP1, EP5, and EP6. Two diesel backup generators are also connected to bus 
one. Two additional facilities, a battery backup system, and a PV array connect at bus two. 
A single distribution line connects bus one and two directly together. Each load and 
generator are connected to the distribution system via transformers. The distribution system 
architecture for microgrid design assumes an 11-kV local distribution system, with each 
facility having its own set of transformers to convert the power the required voltage for 
use. The microgrid distribution system is typical of office buildings and local distribution 
systems (Short 2004; Brown 2008). A survey of commercial building and industrial areas 
within the local area performed by the author also found this distribution arrangement was 
common. The transformers are assumed to consist of a set of three separate single-phase 
individual transformers, with three-phase power entering the facility due to its size or use 
of equipment requiring three-phase power (Short 2004). This transformer and power 
supply arrangement, shown in Figure 11, is also representative of those found in a survey 
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by the author of this thesis. The survey includes local facilities of similar size and use as 
those used in this representative model and inspected industrial and office buildings both 
on the local Navy installation and in the surrounding community. A switch at each load 
and generation source controls power flow for load shedding and isolation of circuits for 
maintenance and repair. 
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Table 6. Summary of Facilities within Baseline Microgrid Model. Adapted 
from Deru et al. (2011). 
Load Facility Type Floor Area (ft^2) Floors 
EP1 Small Office 5,500 1 
EP3 Small Office 5,500 1 
EP4 Medium Office 53,628 3 
EP5 Large Office 498,588 12 
EP6 Warehouse 52,045 1 
 
Figure 11. Industrial Facility Electrical Distribution Connection with 
Transformers 
The example within this case study initially sizes the generating component based 
on the average and maximum loads within the entire microgrid calculated from the load 
data. Generator sizes provide enough power to meet the average critical load with a 30% 
buffer, but they cannot meet the maximum load. The PV and battery system provide the 
balance of power when the generators are unable to produce enough power to meet total 
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load. The PV sizing chosen for the microgrid design produces a maximum amount of power 
over a two-week moving average, which closely matches the generator output. The PV 
sizing is intended to provide some level of redundancy to the generators. The initial design 
effort selects a battery output that provides enough power to meet the total maximum load 
on the system without PV power generation. That battery output produces a system that 
meets maximum load even when PV is unavailable at night or when cloud cover is present. 
The average expected generator output is calculated as the difference between average load 
and average PV generation. The design effort then uses this average generator output and 
typical generator efficiency in terms of kWh/gallon to select the fuel storage in the 
microgrid. The case study presented here chooses fuel storage values to meet a two-week 
island mode objective. The initial design effort concludes with the sizing of the battery. 
Testing of the simulation model to verify functionality leads to an initial estimate of 
approximately 3000 kWh as adequate. This case study uses the simulation model and 
results to guide the design of battery sizing. The model records the battery charge state at 
each time step throughout a simulation. Iterative solving with different battery sizes 
provides information on the probability the battery being exhausted and leading to load 
shedding. The designer may choose a battery size that meets their risk criteria. Table 7 
gives the final values chosen for each of the power generation assets within the first 
simulation model. 
Table 7. Summary of Initial Baseline Microgrid Generating Components 
Generating 
Component Output (kW) Storage 
GENSET1 200 5300 gal 
GENSET2 200 5300 gal 
PV 183a / 114b N/A 
Battery (BT1) 300 3000 kWh 
a Maximum two-week moving average output 
b Mean two-week moving average output 
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Table 8 summarizes the mission impact and critical load demand for each of the 
facilities within the baseline microgrid, which applies the first step of the methodology, 
defining the critical loads and mission for each facility served by the microgrid. The 
mission values are notional, and the facility manager would assign values as necessary to 
quantify the contribution to mission of each facility of interest served by the microgrid. For 
the baseline design and analysis, mission impact is a single number for each facility and is 
assumed to be a linear function of the time of load shedding. The case study assumes the 
two small office buildings are administrative in nature and contribute little to a critical 
mission. The medium office and warehouse are relatively equal in importance. The large 
office contains command and control functions and many support functions, and thus has 
a high mission importance.  
Table 8. Summary of Critical Loads and Facility Mission Impact 





EP1 Small Office 2.8 5.8 10 
EP3 Small Office 2.8 5.8 10 
EP4 Medium Office 32.3 71 100 
EP5 Large Office 267 523 200 
EP6 Warehouse 10.9 31 100 
Total  315.8 315.8 420 
 
Figure 12 shows the control logic used for the baseline system. The design chooses 
this logic with the objective of maximizing resiliency of the system against an 
unpredictable long-term outage of utility power. The logic maintains the battery in a fully 
charged state when connected to utility power. No attempt to utilize the battery to perform 
peak shaving is attempted. Peak shaving levels the demand of utility energy during times 
of high demand and can be used in microgrids to maximize their financial benefits when 
time of use utility rates apply (Stadler et al. 2016; Sortomme and El-Sharkawi 2009). This 
thesis research assumes that this strategy would negatively affect resiliency by leaving the 
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battery in a lower state of charge in the event of an unexpected outage. The generators 
serve as the primary means of backup power to preserve the ESS storage level to the 
maximum extent possible. The ESS provides additional power generation redundancy and 
serves as a surge power generation source when the generator capacities are reached. 
Generators are initially assumed to have 14 days of fuel capacity as a conservative approach 
for meeting the 14 days of off grid generation desired by the Army and Marines, as 
discussed in the literature review (Secretary of the Army 2017; Coglianese 2019). The 
generators are not used to recharge the ESS when in island mode. ESS charging was 
performed only when PV output exceeds demand. If demand cannot be met, then load is 
shed. The model chooses the lowest priority load to shed first based on mission impact, 
and load shedding is iterated to the next lower priority load until the generation capacity is 
no longer exceeded. If mission impact is the same, then the average critical load becomes 
the tiebreaker. The higher load is chosen with the assumption this gives the highest 




Figure 12. Microgrid Control Logic Flow Chart 
Failure rates of the components in the microgrid come from the best available data 
found in a search performed by this thesis. Data sources include failure rates derived from 
historical failures from Pacific Gas & Electric (Horton, Goldberg, and Volkman 1991). The 
IEEE Gold Book also provides data based on a large data set (IEEE 2007). A guidebook to 
distribution systems offers data aggregated from many sources (Brown 2008). Research in 
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the areas of battery systems, emergency generators, and inverters provides sources of data 
for the failure rates of those components (Chatzinikolaou and Rogers 2017; M. Aten et al. 
2006; Obeidat and Shuttleworth 2015). Generator reliability statistics from those employed 
in power systems by industry and the military and those employed as backup power system 
in nuclear power plants serves as the source for those components in the analysis performed 
here (Ericson and Olis 2019; Schroeder 2015; IEEE 2012). This case study evaluates the 
reliability data found based on completeness and sample size of the source data used to 
calculate the values and the similarity in application. The analysis in this case study utilizes 
the mean of the values found when they generally agree with each other, and outlier data 
is discarded. The evaluation of data gives priority to failure data from areas which are 
similar in climate to the Monterey, California, area, which is the location assumed for the 
microgrid system. The operating environment can impact failure rates of equipment and 
the type of equipment used and how it is installed (Short 2004; M. Aten et al. 2006; Roos 
and Lindahl 2004), so data from similar areas will be the most relevant. 
Table 9 and Table 10 give a summary of the annual failure rates and mean time to 
repair (MTTR) used for the baseline system. Failure modes of components include events 
such as generators failing to start when called or failing to continue to run (Ericson and 
Olis 2019). The ESS can fail due to failure of batteries from age or failure of the changing 
system (Chatzinikolaou and Rogers 2017). PV arrays degrade with age (Vázquez and Rey-
Stolle 2008). The values MTTR and failure rates assigned the two tables applies step two 
and three of the method, generating the set of scenarios and determine the recovery time. 
The scenarios defined include the equipment failures, and the recovery time is the MTTR. 
The simulation model uses the repair times to generate the functional state of each line at 
each time step, with line being in a failed state for the duration of the repair time. The 
model then simulates the behavior of the system given the failed state and quantifies the 
load shed and impact to mission. Table 9 also gives the high estimate of the repair times 
found within the references. Simulations of the system using these high estimates can show 
the sensitivity of the design to repair times. 
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line (per mi) Switch Transformer 
AC/DC 
Converter 
λ (per year) 0.05 0.15 0.014 0.01 0.219 
Mean MTTR (hrs) 11 4 4 6 24 
High MTTR (hrs) 30 8 12 12 168 
Table 10. Generating Component Failure Rates 
Component Generator ESS PV Array 
λ (per year) 1 2.06 .040 
MTTR (hrs) 18 84 24 
 
Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the RBD used to calculate the overall failure rate 
each transmission lines. The distribution line contains three transformers, one of the three 
phases of power. The baseline system includes no redundancy in the connection to each 
load or power source. Any failed component on a line results in failure of the line. Each 
line is made of a mix of overhead and underground lines and a switch. For conversion of 
voltage, the generators and loads include a set of three transformers and the PV array and 




Figure 13. RBD for Load or Generator Distribution Line 
 
Figure 14. RBD for PV and Battery Distribution Line 
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Table 11. Transmission Line Component Makeup 













BUS1 BUS2 2000 2500 1 N/A N/A 
BUS1 EP1 N/A 500 1 3 N/A 
BUS1 EP5 1000 500 1 3 N/A 
BUS1 EP6 500 1000 1 3 N/A 
BUS1 GEN1 300 N/A 1 3 N/A 
BUS1 GEN2 300 N/A 1 3 N/A 
BUS1 UG N/A 2500 1 3 N/A 
BUS2 BT1 1000 2000 1 N/A 1 
BUS1 EP3 N/A 1000 1 3 N/A 
BUS1 EP4 N/A 2000 1 3 N/A 
BUS1 PV 1000 2200 1 N/A 1 
 
B. BASELINE MODEL DESIGN ITERATION AND VALIDATION 
The analysis begins with a Monte Carlo simulation of the initial microgrid design 
described in the previous section during a two-week loss of utility power event. The results 
from this reveal that the system is unable to prevent load shedding. In just over half of the 
simulated events, load shedding occurs, and mission is impacted. Figure 15 displays a 
histogram of the simulation results. For this initial baseline design under a two-week loss 
of utility power, the mean sM  is 4209 with a standard deviation of 4707. This analysis 
deems this level of mission impact unacceptable. The results verify the system does not 
meet the objectives. The design process continues by varying the design parameters and 
simulating the various designs, using the summary of results as a guide on which 
parameters may need to be changed. The results, summarized in Table 12, indicate that the 
battery may be undersized. The generators never run out of fuel, but the battery is exhausted 
an average of 61 hours during each simulation. 
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Figure 15. Initial Design Island Mode Mission Impact Histogram 
Table 12. Summary of Initial Design Island Mode Simulations 
Baseline Design 1 
Two-Week Island Mode Mean Max Min SD 
MI 4160 21,140 0 4630 
Battery Exhausted (hrs) 61 191 0 55.2 
GEN1 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 0 
GEN2 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 0 
 
The next iteration of the design increases the generator size from 200 to 250 kW to 
reduce demand on the battery. The 250 kW generator size significantly improves the mean 
mission impact compared to the 200 kW size, reducing sM  from 4160 to 509. The battery 
is exhausted an average of 11 hours, and in 88 of the 100 simulations, zero load shedding 




Figure 16. Baseline Iteration 2 Island Mode Mission Impact Histogram 
Table 13. Summary of Baseline Iteration 2 Island Mode Simulations 
Baseline Design 2 
Two-Week Island Mode Mean Max Min SD 
MI 509 11220 0 1717 
Battery Exhausted (hrs) 10.98 179 0 31.0 
GEN1 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 0 
GEN2 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 0 
 
In the following iteration of the design, the battery size is increased from 3000 kWh 
to 4000 kWh. The generator size is reset to 200 kW. This design choice is meant to test the 
sensitivity of the design to battery size changes versus generator size changes. 
Additionally, the first baseline results indicate load shedding occurs due to the battery 
being exhausted. This indicates the battery size may be driving the failure of the system to 
prevent load shedding. The simulation results of this third baseline are similar to those in 
the first. These results indicate that even though battery exhaustion leads to load shedding, 
the design is insensitive to battery size under a two-week loss of power scenario. Figure 17 
and Table 14 summarize the simulation results of this design. 
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Figure 17. Baseline Iteration 3 Island Mode Mission Impact Histogram 
Table 14. Summary of Baseline Iteration 3 Island Mode Simulations 
Baseline Design 3 
Two-Week Island Mode Mean Max Min SD 
MI 4220 18740 0 4940 
Battery Exhausted (hrs) 57.43 207 0 56.9 
GEN1 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 0 
GEN2 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 0 
 
The fourth and final baseline design increased the generator size from 200 to 300 
kW over the initial baseline design. The battery remains at 3000 kWh. During 100 
simulations of a two-week utility outage, zero load shedding occurs with this design. The 
analysis continues with an additional 200 simulations to determine if a rare occurrence of 
load shedding may occur, but none did. This analysis deems this design is validated against 
the requirement of 14 days of operation without utility power. Figure 18 and Table 15 
summarize the simulation results of this design. This fourth design iteration serves as the 
baseline for the further analysis of risk and resiliency. Table 16 summarizes the generating 
components chosen for the final baseline design under this design iteration. 
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Figure 18. Baseline Iteration 4 Island Mode Mission Impact Histogram 
Table 15. Summary of Baseline Iteration 4 Island Mode Simulations 
Baseline Design 4 
Two-Week Island Mode Mean Max Min SD 
MI 0 0 0 0 
Battery Exhausted (hrs) 0 0 0 0 
GEN1 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 0 
GEN2 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 0 
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Table 16. Summary of Final Baseline Microgrid Generating Components 
Generating 
Component Output (kW) Storage 
GENSET1 300 5300 gal 
GENSET2 300 5300 gal 
PV 183a / 114b N/A 
Battery (BT1) 300 3000 kWh 
a Maximum two-week moving average output 
b Mean two-week moving average output 
 
C. EQUIPMENT FAILURE RISK AND RESILIENCY ANALYSIS 
The system risk and resiliency analysis begin with consideration for failure of 
components and equipment within the system, applying step two of the method. The set of 
scenarios here is equipment failures. In this portion of the analysis, the components fail at 
a random time given a two-week island mode operation. The investigation performs a 
series of 100 iterations of the system for each failure mode. The model outputs the summary 
of the mission impact, how many hours each facility is without power, and how many hours 
the ESS is exhausted or the generators have no fuel available. The steps applied during the 
equipment failure portion of the analysis applies steps four through six of the method. For 
the purposes of this case study, mission impact is a constant per hour at each facility where 
load is shed. Within the simulation, the mission impact at each hour is calculated as the 
sum of the mission impact at each facility where load is shed. The total mission impact 
over the course of each simulation iteration is then sum of the mission impact at each hour. 
Mission impact, MI, is calculated separately for each iteration within the Monte Carlo 
simulation. The mean MI and standard deviation (SD) of MI is also calculated. 
Table 17 summarizes the resulting mission impact for each transmission line 
failure, the probability of failure, and the mean MTTR that was used within each simulation 
to calculate mission impact. Table 18 summarizes these same results for the failure of the 
power-generating components within the microgrid. The equipment failure portion of the 
analysis also uses an estimate of the high value of the MTTR for the distribution 
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components to determine the sensitivity of the mission impact against repair times. Table 
19 presents the results of the simulations with high repair times assumed. The failure of a 
transmission line that supplies power to the facilities with the highest mission importance 
produces the largest mission impact. The microgrid design contains no redundancy in the 
transmission network, and failure of those transmission paths always results in no power 
to the facility. Failure of any generator set or the ESS also results in load shedding with the 
loss of the ESS resulting in a somewhat significant mission impact. The load shedding 
varies within each simulation due to the stochastic nature of the loads at each facility, the 
amount of PV power generated, and the state of charge of the ESS at the time of the failure. 
Figure 19 and Figure 20 present histograms of the mission impact over the set of 
simulations for both the failure of the ESS and the failure of a single generator. In just 
under half of the simulations, no load shedding occurs when the ESS is lost. Similarly, loss 
of a single generator results in no load shedding in two thirds of the simulations. Loss of 
the PV array never results in load shedding. 
Table 17. Mission Impact Due to Distribution Line Failure with Mean 
MTTR 
Node 1 Node 2 Mean MI SD MI Pr(Failure) MTTR (hrs) 
BUS1 BUS2 0 0 3.980E-03 5 
BUS1 EP1 50 0 2.230E-03 5 
BUS1 EP5 1200 0 2.592E-03 6 
BUS1 EP6 500 0 2.955E-03 5 
BUS1 GEN1 43.8 118.0 1.795E-03 6 
BUS1 GEN2 37.6 112.7 1.795E-03 6 
BUS1 UG 0 0 4.402E-03 5 
BUS2 BT1 125 216.2 1.141E-02 19 
BUS1 EP3 50 0 2.773E-03 5 
BUS1 EP4 500 0 3.860E-03 5 
BUS1 PV 0 0 1.163E-02 19 
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Table 18. Mission Impact Due to Power Generation Component Failures 
Component Mean MI SD MI Pr(Failure) MTTR (hrs) 
GEN1 84.8 140 3.763E-02 18 
GEN2 82.8 215 3.763E-02 18 
BT1 597 595 7.592E-02 84 
PV 0 0 1.533E-03 24 
Table 19. Mission Impact Due to Distribution Line Failures with High 
MTTR 
Node 1 Node 2 Mean MI SD MI Pr(Failure) MTTR (hrs) 
BUS1 BUS2 0 0 3.980E-03 13 
BUS1 EP1 110 0 2.230E-03 11 
BUS1 EP5 2800 0 2.592E-03 14 
BUS1 EP6 1200 0 2.955E-03 12 
BUS1 GEN1 78.3 162 1.795E-03 13 
BUS1 GEN2 115 343 1.795E-03 13 
BUS1 UG 0 0 4.402E-03 10 
BUS2 BT1 702 670 1.141E-02 126 
BUS1 EP3 100 0 2.773E-03 10 
BUS1 EP4 1000 0 3.860E-03 10 




Figure 19. Mission Impact Histogram Due to Total Loss of ESS 
 
Figure 20. Mission Impact Histogram Due to Total Loss of One Generator 
This analysis then combines the probabilities of occurrence with the mission 
impacted to calculate the total expected life cycle mission impacted as described in step 6 
of the Method Description section of this report, given by Equation (1). 
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Table 20 summarizes the contribution of each failure scenario for equipment failure 
to the ELMI, sELMI  as given in equation (2) and the total ELMI calculated for the entire 
set of potential equipment failures within the system. The analysis of equipment failures 
calculates ELMI assuming both the mean MTTR and high MTTR of the transmission lines. 
The mean MTTR represents the average MTTR for distribution components throughout 
the US, and the high MTTR is representative of a service area in the U.S. with a long 
MTTR (Brown 2008). This is done both to inspect the sensitivity of mission impact against 
repair times and to explore the change in contribution of each of the equipment failures for 
both cases. The impact to the mission within the microgrid design is dominated by the loss 
of either the ESS or the transmission line to the ESS. The failure of the transmission line 
from BUS1 to EP5 is another significant contributor due to the high mission importance of 
this facility. 
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Table 20. Equipment Failure ELMI 
Component Failure ELMIs at Mean MTTR 
ELMIs at 
High MTTR 
BUS1 BUS2 0 0 
BUS1 EP1 0.112 0.245 
BUS1 EP5 3.111 7.259 
BUS1 EP6 1.477 3.545 
BUS1 GEN1 0.079 0.141 
BUS1 GEN2 0.067 0.206 
BUS1 UG 0 0 
BUS2 BT1 1.427 8.017 
BUS1 EP3 0.139 0.277 
BUS1 EP4 1.930 3.860 
BUS1 PV 0 0 
GEN1 3.2 3.2 
GEN2 3.1 3.1 
BT1 45.3 45.3 
PV 0 0 
Total ELMI 59.9 75.1 
 
D. RESILIENCY TO POTENTIAL HIGH IMPACT EVENTS 
The next portion of this analysis in this case study explores the mission impact and 
response of the system against other, potentially high impact, events. The intent of this 
portion of the risk and resiliency analysis is to explore the resiliency of the system against 
atypical failures, extended failures of portions of the system due to catastrophic failures, 
and failure of multiple portions of the system due to common cause failures, natural 
disasters, or deliberate attack. 
These first two scenarios considered by this analysis are failure of both generators 
for a period of 24 hours or 72 hours due to a common cause failure. The microgrid design 
assumes two identical generators, which provides some level of redundancy, but can also 
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increase the probability of a common cause failure (IEEE 2013). A common cause failure 
such as an incorrect maintenance procedure can cause both systems to fail together, and 
“common cause failures frequently dominate the unreliability of redundant systems” (D. J. 
Smith 2011, 111). Another typical common cause failure of diesel generators is degraded 
fuel (IAEA 2016). Under a scenario of loss of both generators for 24 hours, the average 
mission impact is 2400. Under a scenario where the failure time 72 hours, the mission 
impacted increases to 16500. The highest MI seen under the equipment failure scenario 
was 2800, and the loss of both generators for 72 hours presents a mission impact nearly six 
times greater. A detailed inspection of one 72-hour failure simulation reveals that the ESS 
and PV can continue to meet critical load demand for a short time after loss of both 
generators. Figure 21 presents the state of charge and generator fuel level during one 
simulation, and Figure 22 shows the total load during this same simulation. The rapid 
discharge of the ESS begins at the onset of the failure. Within 19 hours, the ESS goes from 
fully charged to exhausted, and load is shed with only the PV array providing intermittent 
power. The ESS does not recover from the fully discharged state until the generators are 
again operational, and a period of high PV generation combined with low power demand 
provides excess power to replenish stores of power within the ESS. The ESS and PV array 
provides redundancy for providing power for a certain duration but cannot guard against 
loss of both generators beyond one day. 
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Figure 21. ESS Storage and Generator Fuel Storage in 72-Hour Generator 
Failure Scenario 
 
Figure 22. Total Power Demand in 72-Hour Generator Failure Scenario 
Natural disasters can disrupt the fuel supplies necessary to maintain diesel driven 
backup generators (Ericson and Olis 2019). Next, this analysis explores the potential 
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impact in the face of fuel delivery unreliability. The design in this scenario contains seven 
days of fuel that is stored in accordance with naval facility guidance (Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command 2014). The scenario is assumed to be a two-week outage of utility 
power and the probability of successful fuel delivery each day is only 25 percent. Under 
this scenario, the expected mean mission impact is 2020. If the probability of delivery 
increases to 75 percent, then the mean mission impact over the simulations is only 21, and 
load shedding only occurs within one iteration of the 100 simulations. 
A lengthy failure between the two main electrical busses, denoted BUS1 and BUS2 
on the diagram, is a possible high impact event. Even with no loss of utility power, all loads 
on BUS2 are only served by the PV array and ESS in the design. In this scenario, BUS2 
and the loads and power sources connected to it acts as its own separate islanded microgrid. 
The analysis of this failure mode starts with the assumption of a 24-hour repair. This 
assumption results in loads being met in every simulation, and zero mission impact. The 
assumed repair time is increased to 48 hours, which again results in zero load shedding. A 
further increase to 72 hours still results in no loss of power to any loads. Increasing the 
time to repair to seven days, representing the lengthiest repair assumed by this analysis for 
an underground transmission line repair, results in a low mission impact of 193. On 
average, the battery is exhausted for only slightly over three hours during the seven-day 
failure. The system is resilient against this failure mode, with low impact to mission and 
little degradation in functionality even against a long duration loss of this connection, 
which is highly unlikely. Inspection of the ESS charge level over the course of one 
simulation reveals that the PV array generates enough power on average to meet all loads 
on BUS2, and the ESS size is adequately sized to cope with the variability in power 
produced by the PV system. Only in the rare event of extended low availability of solar 
energy does load shedding occur. 
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Figure 23. ESS Charge State during a Seven-Day Failure of BUS1 to BUS2 
Connection 
A design error could lead to the failure of the system to switch to critical loads on 
the loads supplied by BUS2 in the event of this failure of the connection between BUS1 
and BUS1. If the switch to critical loads within the system only occurs when disconnected 
from utility power and operating in island mode, noncritical loads could continue to receive 
power. The facilities may be unaware of the failure of the bus connection line due to the 
ability of the ESS and PV array to continue to meet normal loads. The facility may also 
make the conscious decision to continue normal operations under the assumption that 
power will be restored quickly. Assuming a 72-hour loss of this connection, no load 
shedding occurs even at full loads. Assuming a maximum possible interruption of seven 
days as before results in a mission impact of approximately 2100, which is about a third 
less than the highest seen in the requirement failure analysis. Figure 24 presents a histogram 
comparing the resulting mission impact when normal loads are maintained versus 
switching to critical loads only in this event. In general, the system is resilient to this 
possibility. Only in the very unlikely event of long duration loss of this connection does 
this design error affect load shedding and subsequent mission impact occur. 
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Figure 24. Comparison of Mission Impact Results with Critical Loads versus 
Normal Loads 
The resiliency analysis here next considers the impact of a total loss of a single 
power source, either one generator, the ESS, or the PV array during a two-week loss of 
utility power. A total loss could occur with damage due to a natural disaster, or sabotage 
or failure of the systems during that event which prevents the power source from being 
repaired during that time. In the event of a loss of the PV array, no load shedding occurs. 
When the ESS is lost, three facilities see approximately 22 hours of load shedding each, 
and the mission impact is 2490. The loss of a generator creates the largest impact, with a 
mission impact of 16100 and load shedding occurring at any facility for an average of 50 
hours during the two weeks. The MI of the total loss of a generator is similar to the 72-
hour loss of both generators. 
The analysis continues with an assumption that the scenario of deliberate attack or 
disaster causes the failure of multiple power generation sources. The simulation results 
indicate significant load shedding takes place under a multiple power generation source 
failure when the system is operating in island mode. The loss of the PV array and one 
generator results in a mission impact of 46000, and a loss of load to all facilities. The 
maximum amount of load shed during this failure mode is 122 hours out of the 336 total 
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hours of the simulation. The loss of a generator and the ESS results in a still significant 
mission impact of 26300, and load shedding occurring for an average of 73 hours. These 
are the highest MI seen, with the loss of a PV array and generator resulting in a MI of 
double any other scenario. 
Due to the need of BUS2 to operate as its own islanded system in the event of a 
loss of the connection to BUS1, the resiliency analysis next investigates the impact of a 
combined failure of this connection and either the PV array or ESS. Loss of both the PV 
array and the bus connection for 72 hours results in a low mission impact of 395, and a 
mean load shedding duration of 3.5 hours during that period. The system functionality 
degrades little in this event and mission impact is similar to the low values seen in the 
equipment failure scenarios. Inspection of some of the simulation results reveals that 72 
hours is approximately the maximum amount of time that the ESS alone can sustain 
operation of the loads on BUS2 before load shedding would occur. Stored energy is nearly 
exhausted in many of the simulations. Figure 25 depicts the ESS storage value during one 
simulation where exhaustion occurs. This microgrid design is resilient against a loss of 
both components until the duration of that loss extends beyond 72 hours. Beyond this 
duration, load shedding and mission impact will occur.  
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Figure 25. ESS Storage during 72-Hour Loss of the PV Array and BUS1 to 
BUS2 Connection 
The next possible scenarios studied are a total loss of the PV array or ESS combined 
with a 48-hour loss of the BUS1 to BUS2 connection. The scenario assumes both are 
destroyed, but that that the BUS1 to BUS2 distribution line can be repaired due to the better 
availability of components and equipment for repair of these components. In this scenario, 
loss of the distribution line combined with the PV array leads to a mission impact of 3060 
and load shedding for 25 hours over a two-week island mode operation. When combined 
with a loss of the ESS, mission impact then increases to 5424 with load shed for 48 hours.  
The last scenario in potential high impact portion of the analysis is a deliberate 
attack on the distribution system supply the three facilities with the highest mission impact. 
In this event, the transformers for EP4 are destroyed, and the underground line on EP5 and 
EP6 are destroyed. This thesis research performed physical inspection of distribution 
systems within the area and identified the overhead to underground line transition and 
transformers as potential targets due to them being accessible and susceptible to physical 
damage. The distribution lines ran alongside roadways and could be damaged by vehicular 
accidents. The transition between overhead to unground lines is easily accessible and 
consists of plastic conduit, which could be cut through. Figure 26 presents an example of 
83 
one of these transitions. Figure 27 portrays an example of a pad mount transformer, which 
supplies a medium sized office building, reachable from the walkway on the road passing 
the facility. Under this scenario, two repair crews are available. After the damage occurs, 
one is dispatched to repair the transformers while the other repairs the underground line for 
EP5. After completing the replacement of the transformers, resources shift to repairing the 
line to EP6. Under this attack, a total mission impact of 12600 results, and EP6 is without 
power for a total of 48 hours. 
 
Figure 26. Overhead to Underground Transmission Line Transition 
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Figure 27. Pad Mounted Transformer Located in Open 
Table 21 presents the summary of the mean, maximum, minimum, and standard 
deviation of the mission impact over the course of 100 iterations of the simulation for each 
the scenarios in this section. The combined loss of power-generating components within 
the system produced the greatest mission impact for this set of potential events. 
Additionally, a deliberate attack on the distribution system could result in significant 
mission impact. 
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Table 21. Summary of Mission Impacts for High Impact Scenarios 
Scenario Mean MI Max MI Min MI SD MI 
Common Cause Failure of both Generators for 
24 hrs 2400 7570 0 2070 
Common Cause Failure of both Generators for 
72 hrs 16500 26700 1280 5040 
Loss of BUS1/BUS Connection and PV Array 
for 72 hrs 395 3870 0 710 
Fuel Resupply Probability of 25% 2020 23000 0 4440 
Fuel Resupply Probability of 75% 21 2100 0 209 
Total Loss of ESS 2485 5560 270 1308 
Total Loss of PV 0 0 0 0 
Total Loss of One Generator 16100 42800 1020 9290 
Total Loss of One Generator and PV 46048 48480 36960 2586 
Total Loss of One Generator and ESS 26322 46480 4370 9300 
Total Loss of PV with 48 hr loss of BUS1/2 
Connection 3060 4440 120 1142 
Total Loss of ESS with 48 hr loss of BUS1/2 
Connection 5424 9750 2480 1455 
Deliberate Attack on EP4 XFRM and EP5/EP6 
OH to UG Transition 12600 12600 12600 0 
 
E. SYSTEM DESIGN IMPACTS ON RISK AND RESILIENCY 
The following analysis investigates the effect that different design choices may 
have on the microgrid resiliency. The first alternative explored is the control strategy of the 
ESS charge. This research initially assumed that maintaining the ESS in the fully charged 
state would maximize resiliency of the system. The investigation tests the possible 
consequence of using the ESS to perform peak shaving to maximize the financial benefits 
of the microgrid. To maintain resiliency against a loss of utility power, the ESS is 
maintained at no less than 50 percent charge. A design selection using the minimum 50 
percent charge results in no impact to resiliency. No load shedding occurs during the 
simulation of 100 iterations of a two-week loss of utility power. 
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Reduction in onsite fuel storage is another possible design alternative. Reducing 
the fuel storage from the original design to 50% and 67% of the assumed required results 
in load shedding, and a mean of mission impact of 6940 and 750, respectively. The MI of 
6940 is nearly double that of the highest seen in the equipment failure scenarios. Load 
shedding occurs for a mean of 18 hours with half the fuel storage, and just slightly more 
than two when increased to 67%. Increasing to 75% of the original fuel storage results in 
no load shedding and zero mission impact. 
This analysis continues with an exploration of the design parameters of the ESS 
and PV array on system resiliency against the two-week loss of utility power scenario, 
which was established as the requirement of the system during the system analysis and 
literature review portions of this research. Reducing the ESS size in half to 1500 kWh 
results in no load shedding during Monte Carlo simulation of the system. Assuming instead 
that the PV array size is reduced by 50% to 1500 meters squared results again in no load 
shedding during the simulations. Only when both components are reduced in size by 50% 
does load shedding ever occur. Load shedding occurs only once in 100 iterations, with 
three facilities losing power for a total of six hours. The mean mission impact is six, which 
equals the MI that would result if the lowest priority load lost power for less than one hour. 
The maximum impact during the one iteration is 600, which is still low in comparison to 
the mean MI from other scenarios. Against a two-week loss of utility power, the resiliency 
of the system is not sensitive to PV array and ESS sizing. 
Table 22 presents the summary of the different design choices explored under this 
portion. Against the assumed two-week loss of utility power for this portion, the system 
resiliency was not negatively impacted by significant size reductions in the ESS storage or 
PV array size. The generator fuel supply could be reduced somewhat, by about one third, 
before degrading its ability to function and meet all critical loads. 
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Table 22. Summary of Mission Impact for Different Design Choices 
Design Mean MI Max MI Min MI SD MI 
ESS Used for Peak Shaving 0 0 0 0 
Fuel Storage Halved 6940 42600 0 7700 
Fuel Storage 2/3 of Original 750 12900 0 2300 
Fuel Storage 75% of Original 0 0 0 0 
ESS Capacity Halved 0 0 0 0 
PV Sized Halved 0 0 0 0 
ESS/PV Size Both Halved 6 600 0 60 
 
F. MINIMIZATION OF MISSION IMPACT VERSUS LOAD MET 
The following analysis compares the results when load shedding is based on 
mission impact versus a strategy that attempts to maximize load. The analysis uses the 
initial baseline design with 200 kW generators due to the amount of load shedding that 
occurs. The high amount of load shedding provides more opportunity within the simulation 
for load shedding strategies to affect the results. The first set of simulations implements 
load shedding according to mission impact, shedding loads from the lowest mission impact 
to the highest. Next, this analysis simulates the model with load shedding strategies made 
to prioritize load. Load is shed from lowest load to highest to preserve the most load met. 
Table 23 presents the results of both strategies. The strategy based on mission impact is 
superior to one based only on load. Under the scenario and design considered here, a 
mission impact focused load shedding strategy achieves not only a reduction in mission 
impacted, but also reduces the number of hours that each facility loses power. The mission 
focused strategy improves the total number of hours load is shed and mission impacted by 
approximately nine percent. 
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Table 23. Effect of Mission Impact versus Load Maximization Strategy 
 Using MI Control Strategy Using Load Control Strategy 
Baseline Design 1 
Two-Week Island Mode Mean Max Min SD Mean Max Min SD 
MI 6490 30690 0 6301 7072 31290 0 6798 
Battery Exhausted (hrs) 81 283 0 66 85 266 0 68 
GEN1 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GEN2 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EP1 Load Shed (hrs) 16.9 80 0 16.1 18.2 80 0 17.3 
EP3 Load Shed (hrs) 16.8 79 0 16.0 18.1 79 0 17.2 
EP4 Load Shed (hrs) 16.8 79 0 16.0 17.5 78 0 16.7 
EP5 Load Shed (hrs) 14.7 70 0 14.5 15.8 70 0 15.4 
EP6 Load Shed (hrs) 15.4 72 0 15.0 18.0 79 0 17.1 
 
This research repeats the previous exploration with a change in the assumed 
mission priority. The load at EP1 is instead assumed to be a high priority command and 
control center, with a mission impact of 150 per hour instead of the 10 per hour used 
previously. Table 24 summarizes the loads and mission impact of the facilities assumed for 
this portion of the analysis. Under this assumption, the mission focused load shedding 
strategy results in an improvement of 15% in the mission impact. An inspection of the load 
shedding throughout the simulation reveals that due to the high mission impact of EP5, this 
load is maintained last. However, due to the high demand at this facility, all loads are shed 
under this strategy when available generation within the microgrid could still meet demand 
at the other facilities. This study next attempts a load-shedding strategy based on the 
mission impact per kW of critical load. The intent of this strategy is to minimize the mission 
impact when load is shed, maximizing the amount of mission able to continue given limited 
power. This leads to a large reduction of over 60% in mission impact. An inspection of the 
summary of results presented in Table 25 reveals that load shedding is isolated to EP5 
under this approach, preserving power to the other loads and improving the total mission 
impact within the entire system. Also presented is the total load shed under each strategy. 
The results exemplify that optimization for load met does not produce the best results in 
89 
terms of reducing mission impact. Even though load shed was similar under each strategy, 
mission impact with the third load-shedding strategy is less than half of the other two 
strategies.  
Table 24. Summary of Critical Loads and Facility Mission Impact with EP1 
as Command and Control Facility 





EP1 Small Office 2.8 5.8 150 
EP3 Small Office 2.8 5.8 10 
EP4 Medium Office 32.3 71 100 
EP5 Large Office 267 523 200 
EP6 Warehouse 10.9 31 100 
Total  315.8 637 420 
Table 25. Effect of Mission Impact versus Load Maximization Strategy with 
EP1 as Command and Control Facility 
Baseline Design 1 





MI 8930 10282 3890 
Battery Exhausted (hrs) 75.6 89.3 91.1 
GEN1 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 
GEN2 Fuel Empty (hrs) 0 0 0 
EP1 Load Shed (hrs) 15.5 19.4 0 
EP3 Load Shed (hrs) 17.5 19.3 0 
EP4 Load Shed (hrs) 17.4 18.7 0 
EP5 Load Shed (hrs) 15.4 17.0 19.5 
EP6 Load Shed (hrs) 16.2 19.1 0 
Total Load Shed (kWh) 9620 10660 9930 
 
The investigation of the mission impact per mean load prioritization strategy 
concludes by applying the strategy in the face of the high impact scenarios explored in the 
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previous section. The intent of this examination is to ascertain if resiliency is negatively 
impacted in these scenarios by this strategy, the impact is negligible due to the high amount 
of load shedding which occurs, or the strategy improves resiliency even in these scenarios. 
In each of the scenarios simulated, the strategy of prioritization by mission impact per mean 
load is superior. Based on these results, the mission impact per mean load prioritization 
strategy is recommended. Table 26 presents a summary of the resulting mission impact 
under each scenario using the two different load shedding strategies. 
Table 26. Effect of Mission Impact versus Load Maximization Strategy 
under High Impact Events 
Design Mean MI Max MI Min MI SD MI 
Total Loss of GEN1 and PV 46048 48480 36960 2586 
Total Loss of GEN1 and PV. Prioritize 
MI/Mean Load 17196 24140 14400 2436 
Total Loss of GEN1 and ESS 26322 46480 4370 9300 
Total Loss of GEN1 and ESS. Prioritize 
MI/Mean Load  13998 21600 3800 3797 
Total Loss of One Generator 16100 42800 1020 9290 
Total Loss of One Generator. Prioritize 





This chapter presents the overall summary of the research performed, the results of 
the research, and the conclusions drawn from the research. This section also presents 
potential avenues of future work and further study identified based on the results of this 
research which may help to extend and improve the methodology and simulation model 
developed in this research. 
A. SUMMARY 
Microgrids can meet the needs of the DoD facilities to ensure resiliency in 
continuing mission against the threat of potential loss of utility power. Improved design 
and assessment methodologies and tools with a focus on resiliency can result in designs 
that achieve a higher level of resiliency to all expected threats and augment the validation 
and verification of microgrids against resilience requirements. Better verification of 
microgrids against resiliency requirements increases the probability of the microgrid 
meeting resilience requirements once designed and deployed, which may reduce the 
potential for costly design changes or replacement of the microgrid. Improved tools and 
methodologies will encourage further deployment of microgrids which will help to enhance 
and promote energy security at facilities and may also increase the use of renewable energy 
sources. More suitable resiliency metrics can also improve microgrid designs and focus 
microgrid designers on the most important elements of a microgrid regarding resilience 
Microgrid design tools and methods that employ stochastic methods to accurately portray 
the expected behavior of a microgrid given the expected variation in load and power 
generation can increase the validity and accuracy of design validation and verification 
against resiliency metrics. 
This thesis identified a gap in the existing research, design methods, and design and 
optimization tools for microgrids. To the knowledge of the author, no existing research, 
methods, or tools fully assessed microgrid system resiliency in terms of impact to mission 
achievement. To address this gap in the existing literature and methods, this thesis 
developed a method and metric specifically to aid microgrid designers develop microgrids 
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that are more resilient and minimize mission impact in situations such as loss of utility 
power, equipment failures, and malicious attacks. The expected life cycle mission impact 
(ELMI) metric introduced in this thesis quantifies the system resiliency in terms of the 
impact to the mission performed by a facility when it loses power. A case study using a 
representative microgrid similar to currently deployed DoD microgrids demonstrated the 
method and included how the method may be applied to assess different microgrid designs 
and configurations in terms of resiliency. The case study serves as a template for microgrid 
designers to follow in assessing their own microgrids. 
B. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The literature review and system analysis presented in this thesis identified the 
overall function of the microgrid within the context of its use is to enable mission 
completion by the facilities that receive power from the microgrid through increased 
energy availability. The literature review also found that existing research in the design 
optimization of microgrids does not adequately address optimizing microgrids for mission 
completion. The gaps identified are summarized in Table 3. Metrics, methods, and tools 
used to optimize microgrids often focus on cost instead of energy security objectives. 
Existing research performed with consideration for resiliency used a cost basis or 
optimized the system based on load met. This thesis concludes that a cost basis or load met 
are not appropriate metrics to develop microgrids that improve mission completion. This 
thesis introduces a new metric based on expected life cycle mission impact over the range 
of possible threats to quantify the resiliency of microgrids. 
The methodology developed in this thesis was applied to a case study using a 
representative microgrid. The case study applied the method, resiliency metric, and 
simulation results to guide design iteration and explore factors that affect resiliency. The 
process for the initial design parameters of the microgrid used mean and maximum data on 
solar power generation and load profiles to size the PV array, ESS, and generators. 
Applying simulation with stochastic methods and Monte Carlo methods revealed the initial 
microgrid design was not adequate to meet the objective of two-week of island mode 
operation. Refinement of the microgrid design through iterative design changes and 
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simulation resulted in a system that was validated to meet the two-week island mode 
operation requirement with a high likelihood. The final system baseline design resulted in 
no mission impact against a two-week loss of utility power scenario.  
The method was applied to a set of scenarios involving equipment failure and 
resulted in quantification of the resiliency of the system against equipment failure events. 
The results revealed which potential equipment failures resulted in the highest mission 
impact. Additionally, application of the probability of these failure modes revealed that 
ESS failure dominated the other failure modes in terms of expected mission impact. Results 
from equipment failure analysis indicated that designs which decrease the probability of 
loss of the ESS, including additional redundancy, are designs worth exploring further. 
When considering events with a low likelihood but potentially high mission impact, 
the methodology identified loss of a generator, or combined loss of any power generation 
source with other failures, results in the greatest mission impact. The system design was 
resilient to loss of the PV array or ESS. This indicated that additional generator redundancy 
would be an option worth pursuing. Details from the simulation model also provided 
information on the time dependence of failure and resiliency of the microgrid. The ESS 
provides a level of resiliency against loss of a generator of PV array, but it is time 
dependent. Once the stored energy is exhausted, load shedding and mission impact results. 
Deliberate attacks can also result in significant impacts, and a scenario of an attack on the 
distribution components of key facilities, which could be carried out without many 
resources, leads to a significant mission impact. Hardening these distribution lines to 
reduce the likelihood and attractiveness of these target, or adding redundancy, would 
benefit the expected mission impact. 
An exploration of different design parameters revealed that the ESS and PV array 
could be reduced in size significantly without affecting mission impact in a two-week loss 
of utility power scenario. Based on the results of the high impact scenarios, designs with 
reduced ESS and PV array sizes would likely result in increased mission impact in a high 
impact scenario. The load-shedding strategy also had a significant effect on mission 
impact. Prioritization of load using the mission impact per kW of demand for each facility 
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greatly reduced the mission impact in each scenario tested in which load shedding 
occurred. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis recommends facility managers apply design methods and relevant 
resiliency metrics to microgrids that address the needs for each microgrid system. For 
microgrids intended to address energy security, the identified need is minimizing mission 
impact due to threats to energy security. The methods developed and described in this thesis 
offer a template which can be applied in the early design phase of a microgrid to assess the 
resiliency of different microgrid design architectures. The methods could also be applied 
to existing microgrids to assess their resiliency and target modification and plans of actions 
to address any deficiency uncovered. 
When applying the method developed in this thesis, the author recommends that 
facility managers apply careful consideration in establishing a realistic and thorough set of 
scenarios and threats to energy security. A realistic assessment addresses not just the 
extreme cases, but also more common and routine issues such as equipment failures, 
degradation of equipment, accidents, and weather events. The probability of certain high 
impact scenarios, such as deliberate attack, is very difficult to quantify and will likely vary 
over the lifetime of the system as the threat environment and enemy tactics change. The 
set of initiating events for some of the high impact scenarios can be relatively common 
event, such as vehicular accidents or tree branches causing damage to distribution 
equipment. Focusing on one, possibly low probability scenario that has suddenly gained 
attention due to a recent high profile event or potential threat discovery can result in a lack 
of attention to more common threats and divert resources away from contingencies or 
design changes that could benefit resiliency against more common threats. 
This research also recommends a realistic mapping of power lost to mission impact. 
A limitation of the case study in this thesis was the assumption of a constant value to 
mission impact over time for each facility for each hour of load shed. Mission impact due 
to load shedding in a real microgrid application is likely more complex. A more realistic 
mapping will provide a more accurate assessment of mission impact. For instance, load 
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shedding that occurs in the middle of the night will likely have a lower impact than that 
during the day when the facility is in use. As another example, load shedding at a facility 
where the critical loads are air conditioners may see no mission impact until the load is lost 
for several hours. 
This thesis advises applying resources towards reducing the expected life cycle 
mission impact given both the impact and probability of threats. The results from the 
resiliency analysis method as described in this thesis can guide in the allocation of 
resources and potential actions and plans to address events that could impact mission. For 
instance, power transmission via temporary transmission paths or spare equipment 
maintained onsite can decrease the recovery time of power and subsequent mission impact. 
Generation via locally procured small generators or use of temporary facilities could also 
lessen the potential mission impact in some of the scenarios. 
D. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis research demonstrated the methodology developed and described in the 
“Method Description” of this report using a small microgrid with five facilities as a case 
study. Application of the methodology on real systems would prove useful to further 
validate and refine the approach. As the size of the system analyzed grows in the size and 
the addition of interdependences between facilities introduced into the scenarios is added, 
it may become difficult to manually generate the set of possible scenarios and contingency 
actions. Use of automated scenario generation, such as presented by Giammarco, Giles, 
and Whitcomb (2017) could be applied to prevent omission of possible scenarios. 
Additionally, this research applied the methods to a system assumed to be in Monterey, 
California. Meaningful differences in the results of the analysis may reveal additional value 
or limitations for other locations or configurations. The system configuration and location 
assumed under this study did not include any redundancy in the distribution network, which 
could meaningfully impact the results from each scenario. 
The load shedding within the case study in this thesis was applied only at the facility 
level, with an entire facility either receiving power or not. Implementation of a more refined 
control scheme which can shed load to a partial set of loads within the facility may be an 
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area of additional study as a possible method to further improve resiliency of the microgrid. 
Additionally, this thesis only defined a constant mission impact for each facility where load 
is not met. Mission impact due to load shedding may be time and load dependent. Defining 
mission impact as a function of time and load may provide insight to the design and better 
quantify the mission impact metric. The methodology developed in this thesis relies on 
assignment of a value to mission impact by the facility manager using the method of his 
choice and judgment. Validation of one of the methods, such as MDI, for assigning mission 
values under the methodology in this thesis or development of an improved methodology 
and metric for defining mission impact could improve the method. A standardized mission 
impact measure may also allow guidance on resilience objectives to be defined using 
mission impact metrics. 
Exploration of other factors affecting resiliency is another area of expansion. 
Additions to the methodology demonstrated here could include the ability to move loads 
between facilities or offsite to temporary facilities. Although MDI was found to have 
shortcomings in the values it assigns and the methods, the questions and answers from an 
MDI assessment may provide value for defining interdependencies between facilities. 
Impacts from the connection of and reliance on other infrastructure, such as water or natural 
gas distribution networks, is another area which may affect how mission is impacted in 
different scenarios due to load shedding. 
Load-shedding strategies explored in this thesis and their impacts were limited by 
the small size of the microgrid used in the case study. Only strategies using high to low 
prioritizing were applied in the case study. The load-shedding prioritization approach 
demonstrated in the case study may not realize optimal results, especially in a large system 
with many loads. Application of OR methods to optimize load shedding decisions given 
available power may result in further improvements to resiliency. 
The simulation tool developed as part of this thesis can be improved to be more 
extensible and general purpose to allow rapid reconfiguration and assessment by a user to 
iterate and simulate microgrid designs. The current implementation of the simulation tool 
is in MATLAB. Implementing different microgrid system designs and configurations in 
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the simulation tool currently requires changes in the MATLAB code file itself. An 
improved user interface to ease microgrid design input will benefit use of the tool by others. 
The case study in this thesis applied constant repair times within the simulation 
iterations. Implementing repair times with probability distributions may provide further 
insight into the effects of repair times on resiliency. The microgrid design in the case study 
also only used single connections from each node on the microgrid distribution network. 
A microgrid distribution network consisting of a mesh network or a ring bus configuration 
and the effects of these microgrid design approaches on resiliency is another area worth 
exploring. Mesh and ring bus network types are commonly applied in larger real electrical 
distribution networks (Short 2004). 
The resiliency analysis in the case study presented in this thesis did not account for 
the physical locations of items and potential physical interactions which could result in the 
failure of one component causing the failure of another. Identification of possible failure 
modes early in the design could be explored in a case study similar to the one presented in 
this thesis by applying the methods as described by O’Halloran, Papakonstantinou, and 
Van Bossuyt (2015). 
Given the difficulty in defining the probability of certain events, such as deliberate 
attack, additional analysis and assessment of possible initiation events is warranted. This 
thesis identified several potential scenarios that could result in a high mission impact, such 
as direct attack of both transformers and distribution lines that cut power to facilities with 
the greatest mission impact. Additional analysis to quantify the probability of attacks that 
would cause a high mission impact may improve the results of the method developed in 
this thesis to be more realistic and identify potential mitigation strategies. An investigation 
to explore possible contingency actions to take in such scenarios and the effects those 
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APPENDIX. MATLAB MODELS 
%% Clear Workspace 
clear 
 
%% Set Model Options 
 
%Set Number of Iterations for Monte Carlo Simulation 
MC = 100; 
 
% Set Scenario Name for Settings Summary Output File 
MGSettings = {‘Scenario’, ‘Two week Islanded Operation. Total Loss of GEN1. Priority Sort.’}; 
 
%Set year of solar data to import, set as either year or “TY” for a typical 
%meteorological year 
list = “TY”; 
for i=0:9 
   list(i+2)=2000 + i; 
end 
list(12) = “Random”; 
[index,sel] = listdlg(‘ListString’,list,’SelectionMode’,’single’,... 
   ‘ListSize’,[150,170]); 
if sel == 0 
   year.sel = “TY”; 
   year.run = “TY”; 
   disp(“No Selection Made, Typical Year Assumed”); 
elseif sel == 1 && index <= 11 
   year.run = (list(index)); 
   year.sel = list(index); 
elseif sel == 1 && index == 12 
   year.run = randi([2000,2009]); 




  year.run = str2double(year.run); 
end 
 
clear list sel index 
 
%Set Grid Mode 
list = [“Grid Connected”,”Islanded”,”Import State”]; 
[index,sel] = listdlg(‘ListString’,list,’SelectionMode’,’single’,... 
   ‘ListSize’,[150,100],’InitialValue’, 2); 
if sel == 0 
   MG_Mode = list(1); 
   disp(“No Selection Made, “+MG_Mode+” Mode Assumed”); 
elseif sel == 1 
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   MG_Mode = list(index); 
end 
 
clear list sel index 
 
%Set if random failure mode is used for Monte Carlo simulation 
list = [“Yes”,”No”]; 
[index,sel] = listdlg(‘ListString’,list,’SelectionMode’,’single’,... 
   ‘ListSize’,[150,100],’PromptString’,’Random Failure Mode?’); 
if sel == 0 
   failure.mode = false; 
   disp(“Assumed no random failure”); 
elseif sel == 1 
   if index == 1 
       failure.mode = true; 
   elseif index == 2 
       failure.mode = false; 
   end 
end 
 
clear list sel index 
 
%set Islanded Mode Simulation to false. Set true if islanded occurs during 
%any part of the simulation 
IM_sim = false; 
 
%PV Data 
PV.Area = 3000; %area in m^2 
PV.eff = 0.18; %PV efficiency 
 
%Generator Data 
Gens(1).Capacity = 300; %kW 
Gens(1).Storage = 5300/2; %Gal 
Gens(1).Efficiency = 1/13; %(GPH/kW) 
Gens(1).Refuel = 7*24; % # of hours between refueling 
Gens(1).PrRefuel = 0.95; % Pr of Refueling each time 
Gens(1).RefuelTogether = true; %Set if refueling is together or independent 
Gens(2) = Gens(1); % Identical Generators 
 
%Battery Storage Capacity in kW*hr, Output in kW 
BT1.Capacity = 3000; 
% BT1.Output = BT1.Capacity*0.20; 
% Test with battery output override to test impact 
BT1.Output = 300; 
BT1.Efficiency = sqrt(0.95); % One way efficiency.  
 
%Record Summary of Settings for Output File 
MGSettings = [MGSettings;... 
   {‘PV Area’,  PV.Area;... 
   ‘PV Eff’, PV.eff; ‘Gen Capacity’, Gens(1).Capacity;... 
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   ‘Gen Storage’ , Gens(1).Storage; ‘Gen Refueling’, Gens(1).Refuel;... 
   ‘Refueling Pr’ , Gens(1).PrRefuel;... 
   ‘Same Fuel Supply’ , Gens(1).RefuelTogether 
   ‘BT1 Capacity’ , BT1.Capacity; ‘BT1 Output’ , BT1.Output}]; 
 
%% Import A and b Matrix Values 
run Import_A_b 
 
%% Import Solar Data 
 
if strcmp(year.run, “TY”) 
   disp(“Run Simulation for Typical Year”) 
   run ImportTY_NPS 
elseif isnumeric(year.run) 
   disp(“Run Simulation for year “+year.run); 
   run Import2000_NPS 
end 




%% Setup Results Variables 
Results = table(); 
 
%Mission Impacted (lost) 
Results.MI(1:MC) = 0; 
%Time that Battery was Exhausted 
Results.BatteryExhausted(1:MC) = 0; 
%Time that GEN1 was out of fuel 
Results.GEN1_Fuel_Empty(1:MC) = 0; 
%Time that GEN2 was out of fuel 
Results.GEN2_Fuel_Empty(1:MC) = 0; 
%Load Shedding 
Results.LoadShed(1:MC,:) = zeros(MC,5); 
%Time Load Not Met 
Results.ShedHours(1:MC,:) = zeros(MC,5); 
 
%% Setup the microgrid state table. 
% This is a logical table for the functional state of each element 
 
%Create table with state of the microgrid through the simulation period and 
%set time steps to run as number of time steps in imported data. If the 
%general grid connected or island mode operation is run, assume two weeks 
if strcmp(MG_Mode , “Import State”) 
   run Import_MG_State 
   steps = height(MG_State); 
else 
   % number of steps, hourly step size 
   steps = 24*14; 
   tblsize = length(A_UG); 
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   vartype(1,1:tblsize) = {‘logical’}; 
   MG_State = table(‘Size’,[1, tblsize], ‘VariableTypes’, vartype, ‘VariableNames’, LoadVars); 
   clear vartype tblsize; 
   MG_State(1:steps,:) = {true}; 
   if strcmp(MG_Mode , “Islanded”) 
       MG_State.B1_UG(1:steps) = false; 
   end 
end 
MG_State_Initial = MG_State; 
 
for iteration = 1:MC 
%% Setup the microgrid initial conditions 
 
%Reset MG_State 
MG_State = MG_State_Initial; 
% If a failure simulation, set MG_State for each run stochastically 
if failure.mode 
   run MG_Failure_State 
end 
%number of hours in a year. Used to loop to start of year if end reached 
loop = 365*24; 
%choose random time of year to start time step, unless ts is specified 
ts = randi([1,loop]); 
%Assume Battery at full capacity at the start of the simulation 
BT1_Charge = zeros([1,steps]); 
BT1_Charge(1) = BT1.Capacity; 
%Capture charge lost when battery capacity limit is reached 
BT1_lost = zeros([1,steps]); 
%Setup Fuel Calc 
Gens(1).Fuel = zeros([1,steps]); 
Gens(1).Fuel(1) = Gens(1).Storage; 
Gens(2).Fuel = zeros([1,steps]); 
Gens(2).Fuel(1) = Gens(2).Storage; 
Gens(1).NextFuel = Gens(1).Refuel; 
Gens(2).NextFuel = Gens(2).Refuel; 
% Table to Capture Load Shedding 
LoadShed = table; 
LoadShed.Overload([1,steps]) = false; 
LoadShed.EP1(:) = 0; 
LoadShed.EP3(:) = 0; 
LoadShed.EP4(:) = 0; 
LoadShed.EP5(:) = 0; 
LoadShed.EP6(:) = 0; 
% If the year is random, then import solar data for the year 
if year.sel == “Random” 
   year.run = randi([2000,2009]); 
   run Import2000_NPS; 
end 
disp(“Iteration “ + iteration + “ for year “ + year.run); 
%% Run Linear Solver to find flows 
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%Initialize x with size of array 
x = zeros(numel(b),steps); 
 
%Bus balances 
b(1:3) = 0; 
 
%Find Variable Positions of Loads in Data 
pos.EP = contains(LoadVars,’EP’); 
pos.Gens = contains(LoadVars, ‘GEN’); 
pos.GEN1 = nodes == ‘GEN1’; 
pos.GEN2 = nodes == ‘GEN2’; 
pos.B2B1 = contains(LoadVars,’B2_B1’); 
pos.B1B2 = contains(LoadVars,’B1_B2’); 
pos.BT1 = contains(nodes,’BT1’); 
%Run Loop 
for n=1:steps 
   Overload.BT1 = false; 
   Overload.Gens = false; 
    
   % If fuel exhausted, then generators are nonoperational 
   MG_State.B1_GEN1(n) =  MG_State.B1_GEN1(n) * (Gens(1).Fuel(n) > 0); 
   MG_State.B1_GEN2(n) =  MG_State.B1_GEN2(n) * (Gens(2).Fuel(n) > 0); 
    
   if MG_State.B1_UG(n) == true 
       %Set A Matrix to default UG connected state 
       A2 = A_UG; 
       %Generators are off in grid connected mode 
       b(4:5) = 0; 
       %Battery flow is zero if fully charged or charging if not. Charge 
       %rate slows after 80% charge 
       if BT1_Charge(n) >= BT1.Capacity 
           b(6) = 0; 
       elseif BT1_Charge(n) >= .8*BT1.Capacity 
           b(6) = .05*BT1.Capacity; 
       else 
           b(6) = .2*BT1.Capacity; 
       end 
        
       %Calculated building load demands 
       b(7) = RefSmallOfficeLoads.Normal(ts); %EP1 Load is Small Office 
       b(8) = RefSmallOfficeLoads.Normal(ts); %EP3 Load is Small Office 
       b(9) = RefMedOfficeLoads.Normal(ts); %EP4 Load is Medium Office 
       b(10) = RefLargeOfficeLoads.Normal(ts); %EP5 Load is Large Office 
       b(11) = RefWarehouseLoads.Normal(ts); %EP6 Load is Warehouse  
        
       if MG_State.B2_B1(n) == false 
           % These loads are severed from utility power if this occurs, 
           % change to critical loads only 
           b(8) = RefSmallOfficeLoads.Critical(ts); %EP3 Load is Small Office 
           b(9) = RefMedOfficeLoads.Critical(ts); %EP4 Load is Medium Office 
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       end 
 
   end 
    
   if MG_State.B1_UG(n) == false 
       %Islanded mode occured during some point of simulation 
       IM_sim = true; 
       %Reset A to IM Defaults 
       A2 = A_IM; 
 
       %No grid connection 
       b(4) = 0; 
       %Generators are equally sized 
       b(5) = 0; 
       %Islanded, battery used as little as possible to maximize charge to 
       %maximize resiliency 
       b(6) = 0; 
        
       %Calculated building loads 
       b(7) = RefSmallOfficeLoads.Critical(ts); %EP1 Load is Small Office 
       b(8) = RefSmallOfficeLoads.Critical(ts); %EP3 Load is Small Office 
       b(9) = RefMedOfficeLoads.Critical(ts); %EP4 Load is Medium Office 
       b(10) = RefLargeOfficeLoads.Critical(ts); %EP5 Load is Large Office 
       b(11) = RefWarehouseLoads.Critical(ts); %EP6 Load is Warehouse 
   end 
    
   %Calculated PV output. Output is zero if line failure occured 
   b(12)= (-1/1000) * PV.Area * PV.eff * solar(ts) * MG_State.B2_PV(n); 
    
   %Determine if any load paths have failed 
   if ~all(MG_State{n,pos.EP}) 
       % Capture Load Shed as Result of Failure 
       LoadShed{n,2:6} = ~MG_State{n,pos.EP}.*b(7:11)’; 
       %If load paths has failed, then set load to zero on that path 
       b(7) = b(7)*MG_State{n,’B1_EP1’}; 
       b(8) = b(8)*MG_State{n,’B2_EP3’}; 
       b(9) = b(9)*MG_State{n,’B2_EP4’}; 
       b(10) = b(10)*MG_State{n,’B1_EP5’}; 
       b(11) = b(11)*MG_State{n,’B1_EP6’}; 
 
   end 
        
   %Modify A if there is a loss of B2_B1/B1_B2 Line 
   if MG_State.B2_B1(n) == false 
       A2(1,pos.B1B2) = 0; 
       A2(2,pos.B2B1) = 0; 
       A2(6,:) = pos.B2B1; 
   end 
 
   %Modify A for loss of generator 
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   %Only applies if UG is not connected 
   if MG_State.B1_UG(n) == false 
       if MG_State.B1_GEN1(n) == false 
           A2(5,:) = pos.GEN1; 
       b(5) = 0; 
       end 
       if MG_State.B1_GEN2(n) == false 
           A2(5,:) = pos.GEN2; 
           b(5) = 0; 
       end 
       if (MG_State.B1_GEN1(n) == false && MG_State.B1_GEN2(n) == false) 
           A2(5,:) = pos.GEN1; 
           b(5) = 0; 
           A2(6,:) = pos.GEN2; 
           b(6) = 0; 
       end 
   end 
        
   %Initial Solve 
   x(:,n) = linsolve(A2,b); 
        
   %Determine if generator demand exceeds generator capacity 
   Gen_Demand = -x(pos.Gens,n); 
 
   if any(Gen_Demand > [Gens.Capacity]’) 
       %If the B2 to B1 Buss line or BT1 line is failed, or battery is 
       %exhausted cannot utilize ESS to make up generator capacity 
       if MG_State.B2_B1(n) == false || MG_State.B2_BT1(n) == false ... 
               || BT1_Charge(n) < 0 
           % Below line was useful for debugging in single runs. Commented out 
           % disp(“Gens Overloaded at time step “+n) 
           Overload.Gens = true; 
       else 
           %Otherwise set Generators at full output, use battery to 
           %make up unmet demand 
           A2(6,:) = pos.Gens & MG_State{n,:}; 
           b(6) = -MG_State{n,{‘B1_GEN1’ ‘B1_GEN2’}}*[Gens.Capacity]’; 
           x(:,n) = linsolve(A2,b); 
       end 
   %If Generator demand is negative, then generator output is zero, 
   %charge batteries with excess PV generation 
   elseif any(Gen_Demand < 0) 
       A2(6,:) = pos.Gens; 
       b(6) = 0; 
       x(:,n) = linsolve(A2,b); 
   end 
    
   % Check for Battery Output Exceeded 
   % Add 0.1 Due to Rounding Errors in Linear Solver 
   if -x(contains(LoadVars,’BT1’),n) - 0.01 > BT1.Output * (BT1_Charge(n) > 0) 
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       Overload.BT1 = true; 
       % Below line was useful for debugging in single runs. Commented out 
       % disp(“Battery Output Exceeded at time step “+n) 
   end 
    
   % Check if load shedding is required. 
   bShed = b; 
   xO = zeros(numel(b),numel(Mission.LoadName)+1); 
   xO(:,1) = x(:,n); 
   for i=1:numel(Mission.LoadName) 
       % Enumerate through loads until no overload is present 
       if ~any([Overload.BT1 Overload.Gens]) 
           break 
       end 
       % Set Load i to 0 
       LoadShed.Overload(n) = true; 
       bShed(7) = bShed(7)*~(Mission.LoadName(i) == ‘EP1’); 
       bShed(8) = bShed(8)*~(Mission.LoadName(i) == ‘EP3’); 
       bShed(9) = bShed(9)*~(Mission.LoadName(i) == ‘EP4’); 
       bShed(10) = bShed(10)*~(Mission.LoadName(i) == ‘EP5’); 
       bShed(11) = bShed(11)*~(Mission.LoadName(i) == ‘EP6’); 
        
       xO(:,i+1) = linsolve(A2,bShed); 
       % If load shedding resulted in no change to overload, then skip 
       % to next load. Prevents shedding unnecessary loads when busses are 
       % seperated or load was shed due to a failed line 
       if  (Overload.Gens && all(xO(pos.Gens,i) == xO(pos.Gens,i+1)))... 
               || (Overload.BT1 && (xO(pos.BT1,i) == xO(pos.BT1,i+1))) 
           bShed(7:11) = bShed(7:11) + b(7:11) .* (Mission.LoadName(i) == {‘EP1’ ‘EP3’ ‘EP4’ 
‘EP5’ ‘EP6’})’; 
           continue 
       end 
        
       % If load sheds to the point that the generators are now charging 
       % the battery, set battery charging to zero 
       if Overload.BT1 && (xO(pos.BT1,i+1) > 0) && ... 
               any(xO(pos.Gens,i+1) > 0) 
           A2(6,:) = pos.BT1; 
           bShed(6) = 0; 
           xO(:,i+1) = linsolve(A2,bShed); 
           % And if that leads to the generators now running in reverse... 
           Gen_Demand = -xO(pos.Gens,i+1); 
           if any(Gen_Demand < 0) 
               A2(6,:) = pos.Gens; 
               xO(:,i+1) = linsolve(A2,bShed); 
           end 
       end 
 
 
       % Capture Load Shed 
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       LoadShed{n,Mission.LoadName(i)} = x(nodes == Mission.LoadName(i),n); 
        
       % Check if overload is clear 
       Gen_Demand = -xO(pos.Gens,i+1); 
       if all(Gen_Demand <= [Gens.Capacity]’) 
           Overload.Gens = false; 
       end 
       if ~(-xO(pos.BT1,i+1) - .01 > BT1.Output * (BT1_Charge(n) > 0)) 
           Overload.BT1 = false; 
       end 
        
       x(:,n) = xO(:,i+1); 
   % Iterate to next load if additional shedding is required 
   end 
    
   %Calculate battery state 
   if MG_State{n,pos.BT1} 
       if x(1,n)>0 % charging 
           %Decrease charge by efficiency 
           BT1_Charge(n+1) = BT1_Charge(n)+x(1,n)*BT1.Efficiency; 
       else 
           %Increase demand by efficiency 
           BT1_Charge(n+1) = BT1_Charge(n)+x(1,n)/BT1.Efficiency; 
       end 
   elseif ~MG_State{n,pos.BT1} 
        BT1_Charge(n+1) = BT1_Charge(n); 
   end 
    
   %Prevent Overcharging 
   if BT1_Charge(n+1) > BT1.Capacity 
       %Capture lost charge 
       BT1_lost(n) = BT1_lost(n) + BT1_Charge(n+1) - BT1.Capacity; 
       %Set the charge capacity to limit to 100% 
       BT1_Charge(n+1) = BT1.Capacity; 
   end 
    
   %Generator Refueling 
   if Gens(1).NextFuel == n 
       % Pr of Refueling each day 
       if rand() > Gens(1).PrRefuel 
           Gens(1).NextFuel = Gens(1).NextFuel + 24; 
           if Gens(2).RefuelTogether 
               Gens(2).NextFuel = Gens(2).NextFuel + 24; 
           end 
       else 
           % Reset Fuel Level for GEN1 
           Gens(1).Fuel(n) = Gens(1).Storage; 
           Gens(1).NextFuel = Gens(1).NextFuel + Gens(1).Refuel; 
           if Gens(2).RefuelTogether 
               % And also for GEN2 if supplied together 
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               Gens(2).Fuel(n) = Gens(2).Storage; 
               Gens(2).NextFuel = Gens(2).NextFuel + Gens(2).Refuel; 
           end 
       end 
   end 
   if Gens(2).RefuelTogether == false && Gens(2).NextFuel == n 
       % Pr of Refueling each day 
       if rand() > Gens(2).PrRefuel 
           Gens(2).NextFuel = Gens(2).NextFuel + 24;  
       else 
           % Reset Fuel Level for GEN2 
           Gens(2).Fuel(n) = Gens(2).Storage; 
           Gens(2).NextFuel = Gens(2).NextFuel + Gens(2).Refuel; 
       end 
   end 
    
   % Update Fuel Levels 
   Gens(1).Fuel(n+1) = Gens(1).Fuel(n) + x(pos.GEN1,n).* Gens(1).Efficiency; 
   Gens(2).Fuel(n+1) = Gens(2).Fuel(n) + x(pos.GEN2,n).* Gens(2).Efficiency; 
   % loop iteration to next time step 
   ts=ts+1; 
   if ts > loop 
       ts=1; 
   end 
    
end 
 
%% Calculate Results of Each Iteration 
 
%Calculate Mission Impacted (lost) 
TN = (sortrows(Mission,’LoadName’)); 
% TN is temporary Table to reorder based on name so both vectors for below 
% calculation are ordered by load name in ascending order 
Results.MI(iteration) = sum(LoadShed{:,2:end}>0) * TN.Critical; 
%Time that Battery was Exhausted 
Results.BatteryExhausted(iteration) = sum(BT1_Charge < 0); 
%Time that GEN1 was out of fuel 
Results.GEN1_Fuel_Empty(iteration) = sum(Gens(1).Fuel < 0); 
%Time that GEN2 was out of fuel 
Results.GEN2_Fuel_Empty(iteration) = sum(Gens(2).Fuel < 0); 
%Load Shedding 
Results.LoadShed(iteration,:) = sum(LoadShed{:,2:end}) ; 




%% Output to files 
% Output summary files for Monte Carlo Simulation 
if MC > 1 
   %Write Results Table to File 
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   writetable(Results, ‘MG_Sim_MC_Results.csv’); 
   %Write the MG_State Input Used for Reference 
   writetable(MG_State_Initial, ‘MG_Sim_MC_MG_State.csv’); 
   %Write Settings Used for BT1, Generator, PV Array Sizes/Outputs, 
   %Iterations 
   MGSettings(end+1,:) = {‘Iterations’, MC}; 
   MGSettings(end+1,:) = {‘Year’, year.sel}; 
   writecell(MGSettings, ‘MG_Sim_MC_Settings.csv’); 
    
   % Calculate Summary of MC Results 
   Summary = table(); 
   Summary.MI = mean(Results.MI); 
   Summary.BatteryExhausted = mean(Results.BatteryExhausted,1); 
   Summary.GEN1_Fuel_Empty = mean(Results.GEN1_Fuel_Empty,1); 
   Summary.GEN2_Fuel_Empty = mean(Results.GEN2_Fuel_Empty,1); 
   Summary.LoadShed = mean(Results.LoadShed,1); 
   Summary.ShedHours = mean(Results.ShedHours,1); 
   Summary{2,:} = max(Results.Variables); 
   Summary{3,:} = min(Results.Variables); 
   Summary{4,:} = std(Results.Variables,1); 
   Summary{5,:} = size(Results.Variables,1); 
   Summary.Properties.RowNames = {‘mean’ ‘max’ ‘min’ ‘std’ ‘size’}; 
   %Write Summary Table to File 
   writetable(Summary, ‘MG_Sim_MC_Summary.csv’, ‘WriteRowNames’, true); 
    
   % If only one run, then output detailed hourly data of the single run 
elseif MC == 1 
   %Output x (power flows of each line) to file 
   writematrix(x,’MG_LP_Test_Output.csv’,’Delimiter’,’,’,’QuoteStrings’,true); 
    
   %Create table of power flows 
   xT = array2table(transpose(x),  ‘VariableNames’, LoadVars); 
   %Create timestamps for each timestep as DateTime variable 
   if isnumeric(year.run) 
       xT.DateTime = datetime(year.run,1,1,(ts-steps):(ts-1),0,0)’; 
   else 
       xT.DateTime = datetime(1900,1,1,(ts-steps):(ts-1),0,0)’; 
   end 
   %Move DateTime variable to first variable for better data export 
   xT = xT(:,[end,1:end-1]); 
   %Add Battery Charge and charge lost when capacity is reached to table 
   xT.BT1_Charge = BT1_Charge(1:steps)’; 
   xT.BT1_Lost = BT1_lost(1:steps)’; 
    
   %Write Table to file 
   writetable(xT, ‘MG_Sim_Output_Table.csv’); 
end 
%% Write Summary to Console 
% Added if statement to Console Output and Plots on/off 
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if MC == 1 
   disp([‘Maximum PV Output is ‘, num2str(-min(x(11,:)))]); 
   disp([‘Mean PV Output is ‘, num2str(-mean(x(11,:)))]); 
   for i = 4:8 
       disp([‘Maximum Load ‘, LoadVars{i},’ is ‘, num2str(max(x(i,:)))]); 
       disp([‘Mean Load ‘, LoadVars{i},’ is ‘, num2str(mean(x(i,:)))]); 
   end 
   clear i 
   disp(“Unable to meet loads for “+sum(BT1_Charge < 0)+” out of “+steps+” hours”) 
end 
%% Plot Results 
 
if MC == 1 
   %Plot all flows except those between B1 and B2 
   figure(1) 
   plot(transpose(x([1,4:12],:))) 
   title(“Power Flow in Microgrid”); 
   legend(LoadVars([1,4:12]),’Interpreter’,’none’); 
   xlabel(“hrs”) 
   ylabel(“kW”) 
   set(gca,’FontSize’, 20) 
   %Only plot Battery data if Islanded Mode was encountered during simulation, 
   %otherwise battery was always charged and plotting data for inspection 
   %is unneccessary 
   if IM_sim == true 
        
       %Plot Battery State Data 
       figure(2) 
       yyaxis left 
       plot(BT1_Charge) 
       title(“Battery Charge Level”); 
       legend(“BT1”); 
       xlabel(“hrs”) 
       ylabel(“Battery Charge (kW*h)”) 
       refline(0,0) 
       yyaxis right 
       plot(x(1,:)) 
       ylabel(“Battery Power Flow (kW)”) 
       legend(“BT1”,”B2_BT1”,’Interpreter’,’none’) 
       set(gca,’FontSize’, 20) 
       %Plot Generator Fuel 
       figure(3) 
       plot([Gens(1).Fuel; Gens(2).Fuel]’) 
       title(“Generator Fuel Level”); 
       xlabel(“hrs”) 
       ylabel(“Fuel Level (gal)”) 
       set(gca,’FontSize’, 20) 
   end 
end 
%% Done 
beep;   
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